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of the conduct; 2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages; and 3) civil 
penalties that could be assessed for the misconduct under state law. BMW v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589(1996). 
Westgate's principal focus is, again, the second factor, mathematical ratio between 
the total compensatory damages award and the total punitive damages award. That ratio, 
Westgate says, is 138 to 1 (or 4100 to 1 if the $500 damages for the vacation were carved 
out). (The error of that contention is addressed, supra.) As discussed above, however, 
punitive damages awards in cases involving low compensatory damages are consistently 
upheld with far greater ratios. See pp. 50-52, supra. 
The other two guideposts do not aid Westgate, either. "The most important 
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the reprehensibility of the 
defendant's conduct." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.408, 419, 
123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003). In assessing reprehensibility, the Court should consider, among 
other things, whether "the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident," 
and whether "the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere 
accident." Id. Westgate's conduct in this case falls within both categories. It was 
deliberate deceit, and not an isolated incident. See Exxon, supra (repeatedly emphasizing 
that there was no evidence of profit motive or intentional misconduct in that case). 
In its defense, Westgate can only claim that the consumers were not financially 
vulnerable, that there was no fiduciary relationship, and that, somehow, "Westgate's 
conduct should be construed to involve isolated incidents in light of the fact that 500 
individual claims are being prosecuted." (Westgate Brief, p. 31.) Only by ignoring 
55 
virtually every piece of evidence at trial can Westgate claim that a resort-wide scheme 
involving 2,300 identical fraudulent certificates was an "isolated" incident.11 
The third Gore guidepost is the range of civil penalties that could have been 
imposed under state law for the misconduct. Westgate's memorandum mentions a few: 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act, which would allow for $2,000 per claim; the 
Division of Consumer Protection could fine Westgate up to $1,000; the Utah pattern of 
Unlawful Activities Act, which would allow for twice the damages sustained (plus 
attorney fees, not mentioned by Westgate). 
Glaringly absent from Westgate's recitation of statutory penalties is Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-19-3(a), a "death penalty" for timeshare companies who engage in fraudulent 
marketing tactics. Section § 57-19-3(a) specifically provided (and still provides) that the 
registration of a timeshare company to do business in Utah may be revoked if "the 
developer's advertising or sales techniques or trade practices have been or are deceptive, 
false, or misleading[.]" That would have cost Westgate $20 million per year, far more 
than the jury's punishment. See p. 28, supra. Westgate cannot claim that "nothing in 
Utah statutes provided notice of the possibility of a $1 million penalty" (Westgate Brief, 
p. 33) when it knew that engaging in "deceptive, false, or misleading" sales tactics could 
have multi-million-dollar consequences.12 
11
 Westgate's implications that the consumers were sophisticated and/or wealthy are also 
exaggerated. (Westgate Brief, pp. 13, 31.) Westgate targeted consumers with $50,000 in 
total family income, hardly in the same league as Westgate. (Trial Exh. S.) 
12
 Westgate suggests several times that, if the court "extrapolated" from this verdict, it 
could view Westgate as having been penalized $33 million. In this context, extrapolation 
is synonymous with speculation: It assumes that punitive damages would be sought in 
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• J URISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is pioper pursuant to TTiah Code \nn § 78A-4 103(j). 
ISSUES Pkfc^t V 
Ihr following issues au1 presntlui I** lhi,> Court It>i review: 
ISSUE No. 1: DID HIE IUIAI mur \HIISE ITS DISCRETION IN 
CONSOI JDATING THE CASES FOR TRIAI •? 
Standard of review: \ li •• * •• ~M ding coi -. re 
re^  iewed for abi lse ot disci i tion Slusk Osmtai "If F.2d 437, 441 (Utah 1989). 
Subsidiary factual determination-; In \\\c uui u>u;? a?c reviewed unde a "clearly 
erroneous" standard. Stater Pena. So** i; \ i - - * _ ; / ^ *^;»i i.i,, il'*M). 
I'H sen Jill in • ' • : • ' i 1 mder 
U.R.Civ.P. 42 were preserved at R. 4270. 
ISSUE NO. 2: DID THE TRI u * COURT ERR, IN DENYING WESTGATE'S 
R IO riON FOR,. A Jl JDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT O.R R..EMFI m JR WITH RESPECT TO PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES? 
Standard of re viem : „ *ih respect to the trial courts denial oi Westgate's 
motion for new trial with respect to punitive damages, the record is reviewed .u novo. 
i -t y ( hud'. . , , * • ' • v . 
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 Ul 41, \ 31 and n. 13, 82 P.3d 1064. However, the facts from 
the record are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Diversified 
Holdings v. Gilbei t R 7 w nei ', 2002 1 J 1 129, | 2 63 I '.3d 686 Additic >na- .
 :- , .. 
that s\ ere not preserved , oi are inadeqi latel) briefed,, are waived. Fairfax Realn • .•//>/-</. 
1 
2003 UT 41, | 30 n. 12, 82 P.3d 1064 ("the right to constitutional review of a punitive 
damage award may be waived or forfeited like many other constitutional rights"). 
Preservation: Westgate did not preserve its constitutional arguments 
regarding punitive damages. See pp. 40, 57-60, infra. 
ISSUE NO. 3: WITH RESPECT TO CPG'S CONDITIONAL CROSS-APPEAL, 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT CLAIMS 
UNDER THE CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT ARE NOT 
SUBJECT TO ASSIGNMENT? 
Standard of review: Interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
reviewed de novo. Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, ^  11, 108 P.3d 701. 
Preservation: CPG preserved this issue in its opposition to Westgate's 
motionsito dismiss. (R. 210, 2761.) 
ISSUE NO. 4: WITH RESPECT TO CPG'S CONDITIONAL CROSS-APPEAL, 
SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ATTORNEY 
FEES BE REMANDED FOR RECONSIDERATION? 
Standard of review: The Court is not being asked to review the trial 
court's ruling regarding attorney fees. CPG requests only that, if the court modifies or 
remands the punitive damages award, the trial court be permitted to revisit its denial of 
attorney fees, which was based on the existence of the punitive damage award. 
Preservation: CPG preserved its request for attorney fees at R. 5717. 
2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann ^ I i-l 1-Iw
 t MM)1 ,• 
'T) .-nether he >uk.. or is entitled i:. damages 01 oiiieiuise has an 
dequate remedy at law. a consumer may bring an action to: 
*a) obtain -\ ilrrlmrUorv ind*Mnent thai an act or practice violates 
LIII^ > chapter; and 
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles ol equity a supplier 
*ho has violated, is \ lolating, or is likely n» violate this chapter 
! 2) * consumer who suffers loss as a result of a \iolation of this chapter 
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damages or V.J)00 v hic^-uT 
is greater phr. cour • -sis. 
U.R.Civ.P. 42(a): 
When ;-Jlon> inxolxing a common que-lion of law or fact arc pendin^ 
helore the couri c .-n,,^  order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the malic 
in issue in the actions: it max order all the actions consolidated: and it may 
make such orders concerning proceeding therein as m<^ - ^ d to woid 
i n n e r t ^ a r v costs or Ac\.<\ 
SI'VTEMENTOFTHECASE 
Rather than argue appellee's theory ol the ea«;e in its Statement ol Hie Case, as 
W'Vslgate ha - done <T( - picsenls the lollowiiu.'piocedural .uniinan 
Nature of the ease, course of proceedings, and disposition below 
In 2002, Consumer Protection Group and its founder. Shaun Ade* ix L ,HI ohmuimg 
aN>igi U M - •• • ' 
V^estgate. (Kg., Inal Lxli. A (JLxii. fc;, B ^LxL. ,,., A\c claims arose out _-i 
representations that, if consumers traveled to Park. City and attended a sales presentation,, 
3 
Westgate would give them a 3-day, 2-night vacation package to Anaheim, California, 
which representations the jury found to have been false. * 
Upon learning that Adel was soliciting the assignments, Westgate filed a Verified 
Complaint and Jury Demand against CPG on September 19, 2002, accusing Adel of 
having "stolen" documents from Westgate and seeking, among other things, injunctive 
relief. (R. 1-11, f 13.) 
On September 25, 2002, Westgate filed an application for a temporary restraining 
order. (R. 15.) CPG obtained counsel, and a stipulated TRO was entered on September 
30, 2002. (R. 82-84.) The TRO precluded CPG from contacting any additional Westgate 
customers, but permitted the use of the contested documents for the purpose of preparing 
claims and defenses. (R. 83 % 2.) A preliminary injunction was later entered on similar 
terms. (R.2351.) 
On October 23, 2002, CPG filed a Verified Answer and Counter-Claim. (R. 136.) 
The counterclaim included, among other things, more than 500 assigned claims against 
Westgate under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA) and common law 
fraud. (R. 118-122; R. 632.) 
On November 29, 2002, Westgate filed a motion to dismiss the UCSPA and fraud 
claims for lack of standing. (R. 156-157.) The trial court declined to dismiss the fraud 
claims, but granted Westgate5s motion to dismiss the UCSPA claims on the ground that 
UCSPA claims cannot be assigned. (R. 2339-2340,2346-2347.) 
1
 Claims involving other promised premiums (e.g., a camera) were not part of the trial, 
and are not at issue in the appeal. 
4 
With leave of court (R. 2630), CPG filed an Amended Verified Answer and 
Counter-Claim on March 12, 2004. (R. 2755.) Present counsel appeared for CPG (R. 
2720), and a scheduling conference was held. (R. 2724.) In light of the trial court's 
ruling regarding its UCSPA claims, CPG moved to amend the counterclaim to add the 
individual assignors. (R. 2735, 2744.) Although Westgate had successfully argued that 
UCSPA claims cannot be assigned, Westgate opposed the motion on the grounds that, 
among other things, the consumers lacked standing because they had assigned their 
UCSPA claims to CPG. (R. 2745, 2745f.) The trial court denied CPG's motion. (R. 
2753.) 
Westgate then filed another motion to dismiss (R. 2760) Among the issues raised 
was that CPG's claims "improperly join the distinct and individual claims of over 900 
Westgate consumers in single counts in one lawsuit, circumventing class action scrutiny 
required by Rule 23, U.R.C.P. for such collective actions." (R. 2760f.) Westgate also 
argued that joinder was improper under U.R.Civ.P. 20 (R. 2760r), and that "[i]t is 
logistically impossible for this Court to manage over 900 distinct claims in one lawsuit." 
(R. 2760u). Westgate said that, if all "900" claims were tried together, and assuming 
one-half day for the trial of each claim, "the trial will consume more than 450 trial days, 
approximately 2 1/4 years." Id. In response, CPG cited case law that the number of 
5 
claims is not a basis for dismissal, and that the number of defrauded persons is solely 
within the control of the defrauder. (R. 276 li.)2 
In its second motion to dismiss, Westgate also sought dismissal of CPG's 
amended counterclaims under the UCSPA based upon law of the case, i.e., the court's 
earlier ruling that such claims are not assignable. (R. 2760.) In response, CPG argued 
that the earlier dismissal should be revisited in light of intervening case law. (R. 2761b-
d.) The trial court denied CPG's motion. (R. 2768f.) 
In November 2005, CPG requested a scheduling and management order. In its 
motion, CPG suggested the court "take a small number (thirty) of plaintiffs [assignors] 
who have similar claims in each of four common areas, and separately handle them on 
fast track basis. Once discovery has been completed on the thirty claims, the legal issues 
can be resolved and trial can proceed on these 30 claims. The outcome of trial will 
enhance the likelihood of settlement and resolution of the case regarding the remaining 
890 claims." (R. 2780.) CPG noted that doing so "would allow a manageable group of 
consumer claims to be resolved on an expedited basis," might resolve some common 
legal and issues, and might facilitate settlement, depending on the outcome. (R. 2778.) 
CPG referred to the foregoing suggestion as a "small scale trial" or "test" trial. (R. 
2777.) Westgate called it a "mini-trial." (R. 2807.) (CPG used those terms only once, 
back in 2005, but Westgate continues to use the "test trial" nomenclature (frequently). 
E.g., Brief of Appellant, p. 14.) 
2
 Although both parties loosely referred to 900-plus claims, that was actually the number 
of individual claimants. Because a number of the claimants were married couples, the 
actual number of distinct claims was just over 500. (R. 632.) 
6 
CPG stated, "The question now is how to proceed. CPG has suggested a 
reasonable approach: start with 30 claims. Conduct discovery on those claims, try them, 
and see what the jury does with them. If the parties do not resolve the remaining cases 
after seeing the result, proceed with another thirty. This arrangement - carving a big case 
into smaller pieces - is workable regardless of whether the first thirty are deemed to have 
any res judicata or other preclusive effect." (R. 2821.) In response, Westgate offered no 
proposal for how the claims should be handled, but instead restated its opposition to 
joinder of the claims at all. (R. 2795-2819.) 
On December 15, 2005, the court entered a Scheduling and Management Order. 
The court reserved ruling on how claims would be tried. (R. 2862.) Discovery 
proceeded on individual assignors, and on April 17, 2008, CPG requested a trial setting 
and scheduling conference. (R. 3012.) At a hearing on June 6, 2008, the court scheduled 
a jury trial on the claims of 16 assignors for whom discovery had been completed. (R. 
3351.) 
On August 12, 2008, Westgate filed a "Motion for Trial Order." (R. 4270.) 
Westgate acknowledged the trial court's decision to try 16 claims beginning October 27, 
2008, "but how those claims are to be tried is still unresolved." (R. 4266.) Westgate did 
not make any suggestions as to the manner of trial, arguing only that each assigned claim 
should be tried separately. (R. 4247-4270). Westgate's motion was denied. (R.4680.)3 
3
 Westgate expressed concern that CPG was seeking to "bind subsequent litigation" with 
the results of the first trial (or "test trial," to use Westgate's preferred term). (R. 4263.) 
CPG clarified that it was not contending that the first trial would have preclusive effect. 
(R.4551.) 
7 
The 16 assigned claims were tried to a jury from October 27 - November 14, 
2008. Upon the conclusion of CPG's case in chief, the court granted Westgate's motion 
for directed verdict as to one claimant, George Serassio. (R. 4933.) In separate special 
verdicts, the jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts had 
committed fraud against each of the remaining claimants, and that punitive damages 
should be awarded. (R. 4758-4802.) Additional evidence was then presented with 
respect to the amount of punitive damages. (R. 4749.) 
The jury awarded economic damages in varying amounts to each of the claimants. 
(($500 (Baty), $508 (Beck), $500 (Brandt), $517 (Brower), $5 (Davis), $550 (Detienne), 
$500 (Dorius), $517 (Eastman), $515 (Ellis), $535 (Heser), $505 (Hubbard), $500 
(Huntington), $540 (Price), $500 (Sorensen), and $550 (White).) The jury did not award 
non-economic damages to any claimant. The jury awarded $66,666.67 in punitive 
damages to each of the claimants, for a total of $1,000,000.05. (R. 4807-4808.) 
A judgment was entered on December 11, 2008. (R. 4817-4823.) On December 
26, 2008, Westgate filed motions for judgment as a matter of law, for new trial, and for 
remittitur. (R. 4835.) On April 6, 2010, the trial court denied Westgate's motions, and 
certified the judgment as final under U.R.Civ.P. 54(b). (R. 5829.) Westgate timely 
appealed. (R. 5988.) 
Facts 
Before summarizing the evidence at trial, CPG feels impelled to note that many of 
Westgate's "facts" are unsupported by citation to the record. For example, Westgate 
begins its brief with the following: "Shaun Adel, a disgruntled former Westgate 
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contractor fired for falsifying sales records, stole Westgate files containing contact 
information of gift certificate recipients." (Westgate Brief, p. 1; also id, p. 4.) 
No citation to the record is provided for this assertion, which, considering its 
irrelevance to the appeal, appears to be included for prejudicial effect, in contravention of 
U.R.A.P. 24(k) (brief is to be "free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters"). Indeed, the trial court expressly found that Westgate failed to 
adduce any evidence at trial to support this claim. (R. 5806 ("Westgate did not provide 
admissible evidence, despite its many claims to the contrary, that the Consumer 
information was stolen from Westgate.").) 
Westgate also fails to acknowledge any evidence supporting the jury's verdict or 
the lower court's rulings. Westgate's brief does not contain a true "statement of facts 
relevant to the issues presented for review," as required by U.R.A.P. 24(a)(7). Westgate 
devotes only one paragraph to summarizing (purportedly) CPG's claims and the 
allegations against it, which bear little resemblance to CPG's actual theory of the case. 
(See Westgate Brief, p. 6.) 
The trial court noted this same refusal to acknowledge any contrary evidence in 
Westgate's post-trial motions. (R. 5806-5807 ("The court notes that Westgate 
conveniently failed to present evidence supporting the jury verdict. This is 
understandable because Westgate apparently does not want the court to focus on any 
evidence unfavorable to Westgate's view of the case.").) 
Additionally, Westgate's few citations to the record are grossly skewed toward a 
view of the case that the jury rejected. As an example, with respect to one assignor, 
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Westgate says: "For a claim involving a consumer who redeemed the certificate, traveled 
to Anaheim, and took his family to Disneyland, the jury awarded $66,666.67 in punitive 
damages." (Westgate Brief, p. 6, citing R. 4758-4772.) Westgate later describes these 
same assignors as "consumers who successfully redeemed their certificate and took their 
family to Disneyland." (Id, p. 10, citing R. 5668 (Tr.) 753-755.) 
Westgate's citation to the record begins on page 753 of the trial transcript, where 
Mr. Davis agreed that he was eventually able to travel on the certificate. But the 
witness's testimony actually began on page 741, and painted a far different picture: Mr. 
Davis testified that it took him nearly one hundred telephone calls and three years to get 
his trip - and even then, he was only able to do so because the regularly assigned 
employee, who was a supervisor, happened to go on maternity leave. (R. 5661: T. 741-
754.) At trial, Westgate's counsel characterized Mr. Davis as "another one that won't 
take yes for an answer." (R. 5667:9-13.)4 
Similarly, Westgate says that another consumer "was offered an Anaheim 
Certificate, but rejected it." (Westgate Brief, p. 10, citing R. 5661 (Tr.) 672-673.) 
Westgate omits that, when this consumer was handed the certificate for the first time after 
the presentation, she realized immediately that its onerous terms and conditions made it 
worthless. (R. 5661: D. Ellis: 670-673.) 
4
 Mr. Davis would submit three requested dates as required (consumers were not allowed 
simply to ask what dates were available). Before each date arrived, Mr. Davis contacted 
National Redemption Center, and was told each time that the date was unavailable. Each 
time that three dates came and went, Mr. Davis was required to request another form to 
request another three dates; he went through this process ten times. (R. 5661: Davis: 
741-56.) 
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On appeal, the facts are to be recited "in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, f 3, 82 P.3d 1064. Having stated its 
concern with Westgate's failure to honor this principle, CPG offers the following 
statement of facts, supported by citations to the record: 
Westgate Resorts, one of the country's largest timeshare companies with over 1 
billion in gross revenues for 2007 and 400,000 owners (R. 5668: Westgate VP Tim 
Gissy: 2585, R. 5664: 1695), began sales operation at its "Westgate at the Canyons" 
timeshare resort in Park City, Utah ("the Resort") in October 2000. 
Prior to beginning its sales operation, Westgate hired personnel with timeshare 
sales and marketing experience for on-site managerial positions. Their hires included 
Martin Reese, Project Director, and Jay Bryan, Director of Marketing. (R. 5662: Martin 
Reese: 1175-1177; R. 5664: Vanhartesvelt: 1813-1817; Gissy: 1705.) At all relevant 
times (2000-2002), the directors of marketing reported directly to Tim Gissy in Orlando, 
Florida who was in a senior marketing position for Westgate at its home offices. (R. 
5664: Horowitz: 1968-69; Gissy: 1704.) Mark VanHartesvelt and Gemstone Resorts 
were hired to run the start-up, responsible for opening the resort and operating it at a 
luxury resort level. (R. 5664: Vanhartesvelt: 1813-1815; Gissy: 1705.) 
Jody Linehan, now known as Jody Wright, was hired as Marketing Administrator in 
October 2000. (R. 5662: Martin Reese: 1176-77.) The Gift Room employees at the Resort 
reported to her. (R. 5664: David Reed - Westgate's Corporate Marketing Director: 1782-
83.) The gifting department was in charge of providing tours with Premiums and resolving 
issues related thereto. (R. 5664: Mark Vanhartesvelt: 1829.) 
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During the period in question, October 2000-2002, "tours" were Westgate's 
lifeblood. (R. 5664: Mark VanHartesvelt: 1843-44.) A "tour" is a single person or a 
married couple induced to submit to a sales presentation at Westgate, wherein a 
salesperson would push the purchase of either a timeshare or a VOA (vacation occupancy 
agreement). See R. 4756: Trial Exh Q: Confirmation Letters.5 
Westgate uses various methods to induce tours and/or guests to visit the Resort, 
including telemarketing by its own telemarketing arm; telemarketing by marketing 
companies under direct contract with Westgate; and telemarketing by outside marketing 
firms through a broker, Marketing Decisions Incorporated ("MDI"). (R. 5664: 
VanHartesfeld: 1819-20.) 
"Premiums" are the key to getting tours. Premiums are incentives that a tour is 
promised for sitting through a sales presentation. (R. 5664: Tim Gissy - Westgate VP of 
Marketing: 1716; R. 5663: Brent Ferrin - CPG's expert on the time share industry: 1457 
(99 lA percent of all timeshare presentations are induced by offering a premium.) As 
explained at trial by those in the time share industry, the better the perceived value of the 
Premium, the more effective it is in enticing potential tours to submit to a sales 
presentation. (R. 5660: David Wagner - President of Marketing Decisions, Inc.: 587-
588, R. 5662: 1161 ($500 value is good incentive); R. 5663: CPG's expert Brent Ferrin: 
1445-46 (resorts aim for more value for the gift in order to receive the greatest number of 
5
 In various documents the individuals who accept an invitation are described by 
Westgate as "tours" or "guests." Hereinafter the terms are used interchangeably. 
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prospects); R. 5665: Westgate's expert William Smith: 2188 (perceived value of the trip 
critical for getting tours).) 
The perceived value of the premium will also affect how long a consumer is 
willing to sit through a presentation, as well as how well the consumer will respond to the 
salesperson. (R. 5663: Brent Ferrin: 1474-75.) 
These Premiums are not "gifts" because the recipients travel to the Resort and sit 
through a time share presentation in order to obtain the premium. (R. 5664: Westgate's 
VP of Marketing, Tim Gissy: 1716.) 
According to Mr. Gissy, who oversaw the Resort on behalf of Westgate and was 
aware of the revenues generated by the project, the Resort was certainly a profitable 
project. (R. 5668: Gissy: 2583-84, 2591.) In the eight months between November 1, 
2000 and July 5, 2001, it hosted 7,488 tours, and sold to 1,470 of those tours, generating 
sales of $15,221,980. (R. 4756: Trial Exh. R, Tour Analysis Report (Exh. 529) 
authenticated by R. 5668: Gissy: 2587-90.) The project increased beyond that total to 
average approximately $20 million a year in revenue, (R. 5668: Gissy: 2585) and had one 
of the highest VPG "volume per guest," percentage of sales and average sales price in the 
corporation. (R. 5664: Gissy: 1728, R. 5668: 2590.) 
Westgate's Relationship with Marketing Decisions, Inc. ("MDI") 
Marketing Decisions, Inc. ("MDI"), a broker between timeshare resort companies 
and outbound telemarketing companies, entered into a contractual relationship with the 
Resort on September 27, 2000 at the same time as Westgate began its sales effort at the 
Canyons. (R. 5660: David Wagner - president of MDI: 567, R. 5662: 1028.) MDI was 
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hired to provide Westgate with tours generated through a day-drive program. (R. 5662: 
D. Wagner: 991.) From October 2000 through August 2002, MDI provided 3700 tours to 
Westgate. (R. 5662: D. Wagner: 1133-34.) 
MDI provided Westgate with written "Start-Up Memos" that documented the 
important points that Westgate required MDFs marketing firms to disclose to potential 
tours. (R. 5660: D. Wagner: 571; R. 5662: Martin Reese - Westgate's Project Manager: 
1203; R. 4756: Trial Exhibit S: "Start-up Memos.") 
The "Start-Up Memos" were Westgate's only method of communicating with the 
telemarketing companies that would be contacting potential tours on Westgate's behalf. 
Quoting MDFs president, David Wagner: 
A. When Marketing Decisions, Inc. gives a start up memo to any particular 
resort, they are to carefully read it, change it, edit whatever, and then sign it, initial 
it and send it back to us. That is the resort's way of communicating with my 
company that these are all important facts that should all be given to the call center 
who would then use them on behalf of the resort to make telephone calls. 
Q. So Westgate did communicate the requirement to MDI by way of the start 
up memo; correct? 
A. Yes. By signing this they're saying that these are the things they believe 
are important. 
(R. 5660: D. Wagner: 583-84.) 
At trial, Mr. Wagner elaborated on the resort's involvement in the 
telemarketing process: 
Well, generally what we would do is within Marketing Decisions we would 
have meetings and put forth ideas of what we felt would be ideal for that 
particular marketplace. We would then go to the resort and get the resort's 
approval to use that particular combination of gifts. We would ask for that 
approval within the start-up memo, that these are the gifts we would like to 
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use, this is how we would like to run the program. And they would edit it, 
change, approve it, give it back to us, and we would give it to the call 
centers to initiate the start. 
(R. 5662: D.Wagner: 1035.) 
According to Mr. Wagner, if the premium to be offered by a marketing company 
brokered by MDI contained any restrictions, the Start-Up Memo provided the marketing 
company with a bullet-point list of restrictions that Westgate required be disclosed while 
contacting tours on Westgate's behalf. (R. 5660: D. Wagner: 577; R. 4756: Trial Exh. S: 
"Start-up Memos.") "It's always given to the resort to sign off and approve and edit if 
they feel it's incorrect." "It's to make sure there's no holes in the system." (R. 5662: D. 
Wagner: 994; see also D. Wagner: 999.) 
Westgate required that all marketing companies with whom MDI contracted only 
offer Westgate-approved Premiums. (R. 5662: D. Wagner: 1102; Martin Reese -
Westgate's Project Director: 1280.) Additionally, Westgate required that "All marketing 
materials used by MDI will be submitted to Westgate prior to the use, including all 
telemarketing scripts and confirmation materials." (R. 4756: Westgate Trial Exh. 4; R. 
5662: D. Wagner: 1105.) Westgate project manager Martin Reese testified that he 
believed MDI fulfilled the contract and submitted all marketing materials to Westgate 
prior to their use. (R. 5662: M. Reese: 1281.) 
It is generally understood in the industry that the company promoting a particular 
premium has the right to control what telemarketers say. (R. 5663: Brent Ferrin - CPG's 
expert: 1469-70.) Because telemarketers are paid by how many tours they get through 
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the door, it is an ongoing problem in the industry to control the telemarketers. (R. 5663: 
Brent Ferrin: 1470.) 
One of the Premiums purchased by Westgate, and authorized by Westgate to be 
offered by the marketing firms, was a 3-day, 2-night vacation to Anaheim, California 
(referred to by Westgate as the "Anaheim Cert"). (R. 4756: Trial Exh. S: "Start-up 
Memos.") MDI purchased the Anaheim Cert from National Redemption Center, and then 
Westgate purchased the Anaheim Cert from MDI. (R. 5662: D. Wagner: 1060, 1093; R. 
4756: Trial Exh B: Anaheim Invoices.) 
The Start-Up Memo approved by Westgate in December 2000 for three marketing 
companies brokered by MDI - i.e., the information that Westgate wanted disclosed to its 
prospective tours - did not include any of the restrictions that are contained on the 
Anaheim Cert. (R. 4756: Trial Exh. S (2/20/00 Start-up memo)(Exh. 586).) 
The remaining Start-Up Memos approved by Westgate omitted or misstated the 
majority of restrictions on the Anaheim Cert. Below is a comparison between restrictions 
Westgate told telemarketers to mention (Trial Exh. S: Start-up memos) and actual terms 
and conditions of the Anaheim Cert. (R. 4756: Trial Exh. U.) 
Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U) 
1. Room guarantee deposit of $50 per 
person must be sent in immediately, 
rather than at time reservation is made. 
2. Additional tax deposit fee ($35 non-
refundable) must be sent in 
Trial Exh. S: Start-up Memos 
(3/20/01, 05/11/01, 06/20/01, 09/04/01, 
09/10/01, 10/08/01, 10/13/01, 11/06/01, 
01/07/02, 04/25/02 and 06/19/02) 
1. Must pay a $50 fully refundable 
deposit per person. 
2. Must pay airport and hotel taxes about 
$40 total. 
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Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U) 
Trial Exh. S: Start-up Memos 
(3/20/01, 05/11/01, 06/20/01, 09/04/01, 
09/10/01, 10/08/01,10/13/01, 11/06/01, 
01/07/02, 04/25/02 and 06/19/02) 
immediately. 
3. The original reservation request form, 
no faxes or copies, must be received by 
the reservation company within 21 
days of the date of issue, or the form 
will be void. 
4. "Tuesday arrivals only." 
5. 1-year expiration from date of 
issuance. 
6. Consumers not allowed to choose dates 
until after sending in the reservation 
request form and waiting to receive a 
date selection letter from the 
redemption company. 
7. Consumer must 
dates, at least 
choices." 
"select three valid 
21 days between 
8. "This promotion is subject to high 
season blocked out periods. It is not 
valid during major holiday seasons 
(this includes one week prior to and 
one week following). Major holidays 
include: New Years Day, Martin 
Luther King's Birthday, President's 
Day, Easter, Memorial Day, 
Independence Day, Labor Day, 
Columbus Day, thanksgiving Day, and 
Christmas." 
9. Redemption company must receive the 
choice of valid dates "at least 60 days 
in advance of the earliest departure 
3. No such requirement. 
4. "This is a mid-week trip. It may be 
upgraded to a weekend, if available." 
5. No such restriction. 
6. No such restriction. 
7. No such restriction. 
8. No such restrictions. 
9. "Sixty (60) day advance notice 
required." 
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1 Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U) 
date" [eliminating the last two-months 
of the 1-year expiration period]. 
10. "All requests and correspondence must 
be in writing." 
11. "No-show fee of $50." 
12. "Cancellations must be in writing." 
13. Penalties for cancellations may apply. 
14. "The package is subject to change 
without notice." 
15. Broad disclaimer of liability. 
Trial Exh. S: Start-up Memos 
(3/20/01, 05/11/01, 06/20/01, 09/04/01, 
09/10/01, 10/08/01, 10/13/01, 11/06/01, 
01/07/02, 04/25/02 and 06/19/02) 
10. No such requirement. 
11. No such requirement. 
12. No such requirement. 
13. No penalties mentioned. 
14. No such provision. 
15. No disclaimer of liability. | 
According to invoices, between November 1, 2000 and July 5, 2001, the Resort 
purchased 2,150 Anaheim Certs from MDI. See R. 4756: Trial Exh. B: Anaheim 
Invoices (showing purchases of Anaheim Certs of: 50 (10/2/2000), 100 (10/9/2000), 500 
(10/16/2000), 500 (10/31/2000), 500 (1/29/2001) and 500 (4/3/2001) certificates). For all 
except the first purchase, the Anaheim Certs were shipped directly to Westgate at the 
Canyons. Id; (R. 5663: R. Romanelo - owner of National Redemption Center: 1409-
1410 (authenticating Exhs. 574-576)). 
Represented Value of Premiums Offered by Westgate 
According to MDI president Wagner, Westgate purchased the Anaheim Cert for no 
more than $42 (R. 5660: D. Wagner: T. 592, R. 5662: 1060), and as little as $32 (R. 5662: 
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D. Wagner: 1096), but consistently represented it to Tours on letters and on receipts as 
having a value of at least $498. (R. 4756: Trial Exh. Q: Confirmation letters; Guest Room 
Receipt (documenting the represented value of the Anaheim Cert as $500); R. 5659: 
DeTienne: 109 (R. 4757: Trial Exh. F #0063); Eastman (R. 4757: Trial Exh. H), R. 5661: 
Hubbard: 828-831 (R. 4757: Trial Exh. K); R. 5661: Brower: 871 (R. 4757: Trial Exh. D).) 
Westgate's senior vice president of marketing, Mr. Gissy, understands that the Cert was 
advertised as a $500 value (R. 5664: Gissy: 1720) and Mr. Smith, Westgate's expert, 
acknowledged that the perceived value of the trip was $500. (R. 5665: Smith: 2188.) 
Unknown to the consumers, the low cost to Westgate of a package that 
purportedly included air fare and accommodations was because the Anaheim Cert was a 
"breakage" deal, i.e., admitted by Westgate's project manager to be knowingly designed 
to be difficult to redeem. (R. 5662: Martin Reese: 1259, 1282.) Many of the recipients 
did in fact "break" - after subjecting themselves to the nearly impossible process of 
trying to redeem the Anaheim Cert, they gave up. (R. 5659: Eastman: 210; Dorius 254-
55; R. 5660: Beck: 325-27; Sorensen: 393, 405; Heser: 452-53; Huntington: 604-06; R. 
5661: White: 792-95; Hubbard: 822; R. 5663: Baty: 1389-91, 1394-95.) 
Although Westgate had represented to the Consumers that they would receive the 
premium regardless of whether they purchased Westgate product (R. 4756: Trial Exh. Q: 
Confirmation Letters), Westgate did not want Tours who in fact ended up purchasing to 
have the same "breakage" experience. Accordingly, Westgate employees stamped the 
word "OWNER" on the certificates of Tours who made a purchase during the sales 
presentation. (R. 5662: Martin Reese: 1232, 1274-75; R. 5663: National Redemption 
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Center owner Richard Romanelo: 1420-22 (owners were provided with "more care/' 
"like a VIP," provided quicker problem resolution and might have had a greater 
percentage of owners traveling than non-owners).) 
Westgate's Project Director, Martin Reese, explained: 
Q. What would happen if someone actually bought a time share? Would 
Westgate make any effort to actually get them a Disneyland vacation? 
A. What would take place at the time is, to my understanding, that the 
certificate, if they chose the Southern California certificate, that certificate 
would be stamped that that person was an owner, and so when they sent it 
in they were supposed to get priority treatment. 
Q. Meaning what? 
A. Meaning no problems. 
Q. Don't reject their application for any number of reasons? 
A. Yeah. 
(R. 5662: M. Reese: 1274-75). 
Westgate's Solicitation of the Consumers to Become Tours 
As testified to by the consumers at trial, telemarketers, identifying themselves as 
calling on behalf of Westgate, cold-called the consumers promoting the Anaheim Cert, in 
an effort to induce the consumers to commit to go to the Resort for a sales presentation. 
(R. 5659: DeTienne: 90-91; Eastman: 191-92, 196; Dorius: 248, 276, 298; R. 5660: 
Beck: 315-16; Sorensen: 379-80, 389; Heser: 444; Price: 514-15; Huntington: 597-98; R. 
5661: Ellis: 658-62; Davis: 728-29; White: 783-84; Hubbard: 814-15; Brower: 854, 857; 
Brandt: 902-03; R. 5663: Baty: 1353-54.) 
Westgate's expert admitted that the consumers would presume that the person 
calling on behalf of Westgate was a representative of Westgate's, that Westgate was 
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making the offer, and that Westgate, no one else, was promising them an Anaheim trip. 
(R. 5665: Richard Smith: 2164, 2165, 2168.) 
During this solicitation, the consumers were not informed that the free vacation 
being offered to them had the contested restrictions. (R. 5659: DeTienne: 94-95, 119-20; 
Eastman: 196; Dorius: 249; R. 5660: Beck: 319,336; Sorensen: 379-80, 389; Heser: 444; 
Price: 516; Huntington: 600; R. 5661: Ellis: 663; Davis: 730, 764; White: 785; Hubbard: 
816; Brower: 855; Brandt: 903-04; R. 5663: Baty: 1355-56.) 
Shortly before the Tour date, the marketing company mailed Westgate-approved 
confirmation letters to tours. (R. 5662: David Wagner: 1046.) The Confirmation Letters 
used the Westgate name prominently, gave directions to the Resort and included, for 
those enticed by an Anaheim vacation, a statement that the Anaheim Vacation had a 
value of $498. R. 4756: Trial Exh Q: Confirmation Letters. The Confirmation Letters 
approved by Westgate omitted many of the restrictions on the Anaheim Cert. Similar to 
the Start Up Memos, a comparison of the terms and conditions disclosed in the Anaheim 
Certificate to the Confirmation Letters reveals the following contradictory or additional 
terms: 
Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U) 
1. Room guarantee deposit of $50 per 
person must be sent in immediately, 
rather than at time reservation is 
made. 
2. Additional tax deposit fee ($35 non-
refundable) must be sent in 
immediately. 
Original Westgate confirmation letters 
(Trial Exh Q) 
1. Room deposit sent at time reservation 
is made. 
2. States only that the recipient is 
responsible for the tax deposit 
payment. 
21 
1 Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U) 
3. The original reservation request form, 
no faxes or copies, must be received 
by the reservation company within 21 
days of the date of issue, or the form 
will be void. 
4. 1-year expiration from date of 
issuance. 
5. Consumers not allowed to choose 
dates until after sending in the 
reservation request form and waiting 
to receive a date selection letter from 
the redemption company. 
6. Consumer must "select three valid 
dates, at least 21 days between 
choices." 
7. Redemption company must receive 
the choice of valid dates "at least 60 
days in advance of the earliest 
departure date" (which also 
essentially eliminates the last two-
months of the 1-year expiration 
period). 
8. "All requests and correspondence 
must be in writing." 
9. "No-show fee of $50." 
10. "Cancellations must be in writing." 
11. Penalties for cancellations may apply. 
12. "The package is subject to change 
without notice." 
Original Westgate confirmation letters j 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
(Trial Exh Q) 
No such requirement. 
No expiration date. 
No such restriction. 
No such restriction. 
No such requirement. 
No such requirement. 
No such requirement. 
No such requirement. 
No penalties mentioned. 
No such provision. 
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Anaheim Certificate (Trial Exh. U) 
13. Broad disclaimer of liability. 
Original Westgate confirmation letters 
(Trial Exh Q) 
13. No disclaimer of liability. 
According to the testifying consumers, when they arrived at the Resort for then-
sales presentation, they presented their Confirmation Letter to the front desk and filled 
out a "Guest Information Sheet," which typically listed the Premium offered. (R. 5659: 
DeTienne: 112-23; R. 4757: Eastman: Trial Exh. H; Dorius: Trial Exh. G; R. 5660: Beck: 
321, 332-33; Sorensen: 388, 390; R. 4757: Heser: Trial Exh. J; Price: Trial Exh. M; R. 
5660: Huntington: 601; R. 5661: Ellis: 668; Davis: 736; White: 788; Hubbard: 818-19; 
Brower: 858-59; Brandt: 905-06; R. 5663: Baty: 1365.) 
During the consumers' tours, an on-site Westgate salesperson subjected each to a 
high-pressure sales presentation which often lasted longer than the promised 90 minutes.6 
At the end of the sales pitch, the consumers received their chosen premium. For 
the Anaheim Cert, this was the first time that consumers had the opportunity to see the 
many restrictions that played such a key role in making the Anaheim Cert a "breakage" 
deal. (R. 5659: DeTienne: 109; Eastman: 201; Dorius: 249; R. 5660: Beck: 324; 
Sorensen: 391; Heser: 451; Price: 521-22; Huntington: 601; R. 5661: Ellis: 670-73, 700; 
Davis: 739; White: 790-91; Hubbard: 820; Brower: 862-63; Brandt: 911-12; R. 5663: 
Baty: 1384.) 
6
 R. 5660: Beck: 322 (2 V2 - 3 hours); Price: 519, 521 (3 hours); Huntington: 601 (2 
hours); R. 5661: Ellis: 670 (2 hours); Davis: 737 (2 hours), White: 789 (over 3 hours); 
Hubbard: 819 (2 V2 hours); R. 5663: Baty: 1370 (2 V2 hours). 
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According to CPG's expert, at this moment, Westgate had committed a "bait and 
switch." (R. 5663: Ferrin: 1481; see also, testimony of consumers who believed it was a 
"bait and switch" (R. 5660: Sorensen: 436-37; R. 5661: Ellis: 677).) 
Upon seeing the previously undisclosed restrictions, two of the consumers were so 
frustrated by receiving a premium that was very different than what they were promised 
that they simply gave up without trying to redeem the Anaheim Cert. (R. 5661: Ellis: 
670-73, 700; R. 5660: Price: 523-26, 546.) Others contacted the redemption company, 
discovered how difficult it would be to redeem, and gave up. (R. 5661: Brower: 865-67; 
Brandt: 915-18; R. 5663: Baty: 1389-91, 1394-95.) 
The other Consumers attempted to redeem their certificates by navigating the 
labyrinthian process described on the certificate (Trial Exh U): 
• mailing in $135, which had to be received by the redemption company 
within 21 days of the consumer's receipt of the certificate; 
waiting for National Redemption Center to respond; 
filling out a form sent to them by NRC to request 3 ccvalid" dates that 
were: 
at least 21 days between choices; 
at least 60 days beyond the date that NRC would receive the 
choices in the mail; 
Tuesday arrivals only; 
not during (unidentified) "high season blocked out periods"; 
not during major holiday seasons that include one week prior to 
and one week following: New Year's Day, Martin Luther King's 
Birthday, President's Day, Easter, Memorial Day, Independence 
Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Thanksgiving Day, and 
Christmas. 
• ensuring that both travelers signed the certificate, lest it be voided. 
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Consumers had to wait and see if their requested dates would be deemed "valid" 
and available, which, consistent with the "breakage" concept, turned out to be never. 
Despite complying with the restrictions, none of the consumers except for Mr. Davis -
after one hundred calls and a fortuitous baby - were able to travel, even when some chose 
to submit additional "valid" dates after their previous dates were rejected for unspecified 
reasons. (R. 5659: DeTienne: 122-33 (trying for six years); Eastman: 210 (finally gave 
up after 4 attempts); Dorius: 254-55 (tried 2 or 3 times); R. 5660: Beck: 325-27 (made 3 
separate attempts to redeem the Cert.); Sorensen: 393, 405; Heser: 452-53 (tried to 
redeem 3 or 4 times); Huntington: 604-606 (tried to redeem 4 times); R. 5661: White: 
792-95 (filled out form and tried to redeem 4 times); Hubbard: 823.) 
Many of the frustrated consumers attempted to contact NRC or Westgate by phone 
for assistance. Those who called NRC were told either to wait for their chosen dates to 
lapse or to fill out an additional request for dates. (See, e.g., R. 5661: Huntington: 605-
06; Davis: 741-56.) NRC refused to provide a list of dates that were available. (R. 5660: 
Beck: 327; R. 5661: Huntington: 607; Davis: 741-56; White: 793.) Westgate told 
consumers who called it to contact NRC. (R. 5661: DeTienne: 127-28 ("I called 
Westgate at least 20 times." They told me "[i]f s not their problem."); R. 5660: Heser: 
453-54 (contacted Westgate 3 or 4 times, they told her to contact NRC.) 
Westgate's Knowledge of the Problems with the Anaheim Certs. 
Westgate received many complaints regarding the restrictions on, and the 
difficulty of redeeming, the Anaheim Certs. In fact, Martin Reese, the project director in 
2001, admits that he was told by Jody Linehan, the person responsible for complaints 
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related to the premiums, that Westgate needed to get rid of the Anaheim Cert. (R. 5662: 
Reese: 1264 ("...I believe that Jody Linehan in our marketing department was the one 
that finally said, 'You know what? We need to get rid of this/ because they were having 
too many problems with people having problems redeeming it."), 1275). CPG's expert 
opined that Westgate was on notice by February 2001, which predated the tours of any of 
the consumers at trial. (R. 5663: Ferrin: 1615, 1620-21.) 
Often, Westgate salespersons and gift room employees, knowing the real nature of 
the Anaheim Cert, tried to persuade the consumer to switch to another gift. (R. 5659: 
DeTienne: 101, 106 (sales agent said, "[l]ook, I like you, this isn't in your best interest. 
We're done with the sales thing, now for the gift thing. If you want a gift, you should 
choose one of the other two because you have a chance of getting something, and this one 
we know it's just nobody ever gets the gift. You get a piece of paper that's worthless. 
You really need to take the others."); R. 5662: Martin Reese - Westgate's Project 
Manager: 1267-68 (Q. "So if someone would come in, having come with a promise for 
this and get talked into something else?" A. My answer was, "Yes." Q. "How many 
times do you thing that occurred?" A. And I said, "It probably happened a lot." Q. 
"Hundreds?" A. "Okay.").) 
Despite this knowledge of the difficulties in trying to redeem the premium, 
Westgate continued to use the Anaheim Cert (R. 5662: Martin Reese: 1265) until it 
learned that CPG had been formed and was soliciting consumers to become part of a 
lawsuit. (R. 4757: Trial Exh. B: Anaheim Invoices, Exh. 574-576 (showing purchases of 
Anaheim Certs as late at August 14, 2002 and credit for 25 Anaheim certs on September 
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17, 2002); R. 4756: Trial Exh. S: Start-Up Memos (June 19, 2002 start-up memo offering 
Anaheim trip)); R. 5664: Gissy: 1712).) Westgate filed suit against CPG on September 
19, 2002. 
At trial, Westgate, MDI and National Redemption Center claimed to have no idea 
what the redemption or travel rates (the percentage of tours given the certificate who tried 
to redeem them and the percentage who actually travelled) were for the Anaheim Cert. 
(R. 5662: Martin Reese - Westgate's Project Director: 1211, 1297 (Westgate not given 
the redemption statistics); David Wagner: 1147 (MDI doesn't know the travel rate on the 
Anaheim Cert.); R. 5664: Felix Revuelta: 1913 (National Redemption Center has no idea 
how many Cert holders actually traveled.).) Perhaps not coincidentally, a MDI employee 
admitted that MDI shredded all documents relating to Westgate in August 2003, after this 
lawsuit began. (R. 5664: Sherri Miller: 1961-1962.) 
CPG's expert found this claimed lack of knowledge especially damning because: 
The redemption rate is probably the single most important thing in 
my estimation as to the value of the certificate and the value to the 
consumers themselves. If you don't know how many people are 
actually able to travel, then if I were a consultant advising a 
developer, I would say then you're in trouble. 
That's one of the most critical factors that you need to understand 
about any gift, how many people are actually using it and how many 
are using it successfully. 
(R. 5663: Brent Ferrin: 1492.) 
The expert explained to the jury that the "redemption rate" is the single most 
important factor when evaluating the "true value" of the certificate and whether it was 
being represented properly to the consumer. (R. 5663: Brent Ferrin: 1492-93.) 
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Consumers9 Assignments of Their Claims to CPG 
At trial, the consumers testified that they intended to and did assign their claims 
against Westgate to CPG. (R. 5659: DeTienne: 136-38; Eastman: 212-13; Dorius: 259-
60; R. 5660: Beck: 343; Sorensen: 395; Heser: 462, 466; Price: 539-40; Huntington: 611; 
R. 5661: Ellis: 679; Davis: 763; White: 801; Hubbard: 828; Brower: 875; Brandt: 925; R. 
5663: Baty: 1397.) 
Westgate Resorts' Financial Information 
David Crabtree is the Chief Operating Officer for the Sales and Marketing 
Department of Westgate. (R. 5668: Crabtree: 2601.) The net equity (net worth) of 
Westgate had grown from between $100 million to $150 million in 2000, to $519 million 
as of the end of 2007. (R. 5668: Crabtree: 2605, 2621.) After opining that Westgate had 
lost value due to the credit crunch, he stated that Westgate believes that the bailout for the 
credit industry would help Westgate recover. (R. 5668: Crabtree: 2612, 2630.) The 
resort at Westgate at the Canyons has consistently created revenue of $20 to $22 million 
per year. (R. 5668: Crabtree: 2607.) 
At trial, Westgate stipulated to the instructions given to the jury regarding punitive 
damages. (R. 5668: Tr. 2561-2574, 2577-2578 (no objection to Instruction 75 and 76, 
"which are fine"), 2636-2639.) Westgate did not proffer any instructions of its own that 
were rejected by the trial court. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Westgate has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in 
consolidating the cases for trial. Westgate's principal challenge to the consolidation is 
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that the claims were factually "disparate/' but the trial court's finding to the contrary can 
be reversed only if shown to be clearly erroneous. Where CPG's theory of the case was 
the same for each claim, the alleged conduct of Westgate was the same for each claim, 
and even Westgate itself characterized consumers' testimony as redundant, the trial 
court's finding that the consolidated claims were "strikingly similar" is fully supported. 
Once a common question of fact or law was found to exist, the trial court had 
considerable discretion in managing the trial. Under U.R.Civ.P. 42, the court was 
permitted to considered a wide range of factors, such as convenience and judicial 
economy. Westgate never offered any suggestions to the court for trying hundreds of 
claims, and has not established a basis for criticizing the court's efforts. 
Westgate has also failed to establish prejudice. Its argument that prejudice should 
simply be presumed fails to meet its burden on appeal. Although Westgate claims that 
consolidation allowed the introduction of inadmissible evidence, it neither acknowledges 
the trial court's ruling regarding the evidence nor shows the court's evidentiary rulings to 
have been an abuse of discretion. Westgate's further claim of prejudice arising from a 
failure to instruct the jury adequately is waived because Westgate never objected to the 
jury instructions, nor promulgated a proposed instruction of its own. 
With respect to punitive damages, Westgate has established neither a violation of 
the federal constitutional nor of state law. Initially, CPG notes that Westgate has failed to 
provide an appropriate statement of facts or record citations, and has refused to admit that 
any evidence exists in support of the jury verdict. Accordingly, Westgate's challenge to 
the punitive damages award should be disregarded as inadequately briefed. 
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On the merits, applying the seven Crookston factors demonstrates the 
reasonableness of the jury's verdict. Westgate's principal focus, the ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages, is largely immaterial in small-damage cases, as 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court and numerous other courts. As the trial 
court also observed, a jury could have found a high likelihood of recurrence, particularly 
in view of Westgate's belligerence and even utter disrespect of the consumers, the trial 
court, and counsel. 
Analysis of the Crookston factors is also informative on Westgate's federal 
challenge: Reprehensibility is high; the ratio is largely irrelevant, and Westgate's 
fraudulent sales tactics could have resulted in a statutory "death penalty" costing it far 
more than the jury's award. Westgate's protestations of innocence are too little, too late 
- the jury reasonably concluded that, given Westgate's wealth, conduct, and attitude, it 
would require an award of $1 million to get its attention. 
With respect to CPG's conditional cross appeal, the trial court erred in ruling that 
claims under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act are not assignable. This Court has 
held that choses in action are assignable, and the trend has long been to expand the field 
of assignable claims. The Act does not prohibit assignments, and the trial court erred in 
ruling otherwise. 
Also as to CPG's conditional cross appeal, (only) if the punitive damage award is 
modified or reversed, the trial court should be permitted to revisit its denial of CPG's 
request for attorney fees. With respect to the private attorney general doctrine, the court 
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premised its denial on a determination that the considerations raised by CPG were 
adequately addressed in the punitive damage award. 
ARGUMENT 
L WESTGATE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONSOLIDATING 
THE CASES FOR TRIAL, NOR ESTABLISHED PREJUDICE 
IN ANY EVENT. 
Westgate's brief acknowledges that trial courts are afforded discretion in making 
decisions regarding consolidation. (Westgate Brief, p. 17 ("When cases present ca 
common question of law or fact/ Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
trial courts discretion in deciding whether to consolidate issues for trial.")) Indeed, it is 
"considerable" discretion. Slusher v. Ospital, 111 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah 1989). 
Westgate further concedes that claims "can be" consolidated under Rule 42 if 
there is a common question of law or fact (Westgate Brief at 18), and that such 
consolidation is not "per se impermissible[.]" Id. Westgate argues, however, that there 
was no common question of law or fact in this case, because the consolidated claims were 
too "disparate." 
n 
Westgate does not suggest that claims must be identical in order to be consolidated, nor 
is there any authority for that proposition. Accordingly, Westgate must show not only 
that the facts were disparate, but that they were really disparate. See, e.g., 9A Fed. Prac. 
& Proa Civ. § 2384 (3d ed.) ("A substantial common question of law or fact is enough. 
If an appropriate common question exists, federal courts often have consolidated actions 
despite differences in the parties.") 
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Westgate has not challenged on appeal the trial court's ruling that joinder of 
claims in the first instance was appropriate under U.R.Civ.P. 20. In that ruling, the court 
wrote: 
As CPG is quick to point out, Westgate is unclear about what it wants the court to 
do with CPG's 950 claims. As a practical matter, since CPG is presumably the 
owner of 950 validly assigned claims, the court is faced with two options: (1) 
reject Westgate's argument and allow CPG to bring the claims in one lawsuit; or 
(2) accept Westgate's argument and force CPG to bring the claims in 950 separate 
lawsuits. No doubt if CPG brings 950 suits someone would seek to consolidate 
the cases either for discovery purposes or for trial. 
(R. 2768f.) 
The court then concluded that joinder was proper. The court observed that "CPG 
alleges Westgate was involved in a systematic, ongoing pattern of fraudulent activity that 
affected many, many individuals," and that such allegations expressly involved a "series 
of transactions" as contemplated by Rule 20(a). (R. 2768f-h.) Westgate's 
characterization of the assignors' affidavits as "fill-in-the-blank and check-box" forms 
"only bolsters CPG's position," the court observed. (R. 2768h.) 
With respect to the number of claims, the trial court said, "Here, without doubt a 
single, massive trial including 950 consumer claims will be costly, time-consuming, and 
a logistical nightmare. But, it seems to me, separating the matter into 950 individual 
trials only will exacerbate the delay and expense to the parties and increase the 
administrative burden to the court." The court wrote: 
Westgate claims that a lawsuit involving the claims of 950 consumers, each 
of whom may be required to testify, will be extremely time-consuming, 
although Westgate's figure of a half-day per witness seems significantly 
exaggerated. I cannot conceive, however, that such a trial likely will be 
more time-consuming and an administrative headache than 950 separate 
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trials, including selecting and instructing 950 separate juries, 950 separate 
opening statements and closing arguments, 950 separate plans for 
discovery, and 950 separate pre-trial hearings, motion hearings, rulings and 
orders, all asserted by CPG as assignee against Westgate, all involving 
highly similar facts and claiming essentially the same injury. Indeed, could 
there be a better argument for consolidation? 
(R. 2768i n. 4.)8 
Westgate has not met its obligation of marshaling all evidence in support of the 
trial court's factual determination that the claims were factually similar. U.R.A.P. 
24(a)(9) provides: "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding." The trial court's assessment of whether 
common factual issues exist, particularly after the trial, is such a finding. See, e.g., 9A 
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2383 ("The district court is given broad discretion to decide 
whether consolidation under Rule 42(a) would be desirable and the district judge's 
decision inevitably is highly contextual, as the case law amply demonstrates."). 
Westgate itself repeatedly characterizes the trial court's ruling as based upon a 
misapprehension of the facts. E.g., Westgate Brief, p. 4 ("the trial court chose not to 
consolidate 15 similar claims for trial, but instead consolidated 15 claims with disparate 
facts"; p. 14 ("The first fundamental error was consolidating 15 disparate claims for trial 
In finding joinder appropriate, the court concluded that the claims "aris[e] out of the 
same . . . series of transactions." U.R.Civ.P. 20. Based thereon, it is clear CPG is 
asserting a series of injuries to a long list of assignors all of which arose out of a single 
series of transactions." (R. 2768h.) Rule 42 permits actions to be consolidated for trial if 
they "involv[e] a common question of law or fact[.]" The court's unchallenged Rule 20 
finding that a "question of law or fact common to all of th[e claims]" precludes a 
contention by Westgate that no "common question of law or fact" is involved. 
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instead of holding separate trials or at least consolidating claims with similar fact 
patterns."). 
Rule 24(a)(9) applies to any factual determinations, including those of a trial judge 
exercising its discretion. Westgate has not mentioned, let alone marshaled, any evidence 
supporting the trial court's determinations that common questions of fact or law existed. 
Steele v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n of Utah, 845 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah 1993). ("If 
a party fails to provide a statement of the facts along with a citation to the record where 
those facts are supported, we will assume the correctness of the judgment.") 
No argument can be made that the trial court's factual determinations were clearly 
erroneous, or that any abuse of discretion occurred. By the time of trial, the claims had 
been narrowed to those involving a single premium, the bogus travel certificate. CPG 
had the same theory of the case as to each consumer, that Westgate5 s fraud was complete 
at the moment the sales presentation ended, because that was when the "bait and switch" 
occurred: Westgate held out a certificate it had misrepresented as worth $500 but knew 
was actually worthless. 
At that point, the only dissimilarity is one that would exist in virtually all 
consolidated cases (and in any case with more than one claimant): the specific amount of 
damages to which each claimant is entitled. Even that question involved relatively little 
variation in this case. Westgate set the floor for damages by acknowledging in writing 
that the value of the Anaheim trip, had it been legitimate, was $500. (See pp. 18-19, 
supra.) Added to that were out-of-pocket expenses and other minor, individualized 
damages. (R. 4774-4802.) 
34 
Having sat through ten days of trial, the trial court reaffirmed its original 
determination that the claims shared common issues - and, indeed, were "strikingly 
similar": 
The court already meticulously weighed and balanced the factors in 
deciding whether to consolidate the claims of CPG. Westgate has 
presented no new arguments or case law justifying reconsideration of this 
careful decision. Certainly, the striking similarity of the Consumer claims 
supported the court's decision to consolidate. This determination comports 
with judicial economy and efficiency and avoids unnecessary costs and 
delays. Further, CPG had a right to show evidence of knowledge, intent 
and plan, pursuant to Rule of Evidence 404(b). Westgate complained of the 
'mind-numbing redundancy" of CPG's witness testimony. Separate trials 
for each individual claim would have been no less redundant; perhaps it 
would have more redundant because witnesses may have been called to re-
testify in each and every case. The court was not and is not unmindful of 
the potential prejudice toward Westgate of requiring a jury to consider 
many similar fraudulent acts committed against the Consumers in a single 
trial. Westgate argues that its right to defend itself was sacrificed to 
judicial economy. This is not true. Westgate still had the right, and 
exercised that right, to defend itself against the claims of CPG. Just 
because Westgate lost at trial did not mean that it was not afforded an 
essential trial right. The court finds that, on balance, the right decision (to 
consolidate) was made, and the court will not disturb that decision. 
(R. 5805-5806.) Westgate itself complained that the consumers' trial testimony consisted 
of "mind numbing redundancy," conceding the similarity of claims. (R. 4918.) 
Westgate mentions none of the foregoing, nor even the trial court's rationale for 
consolidation. To the contrary, it misrepresents the basis for the court's consolidation 
order. Westgate says: 
The stated purpose of consolidation was to 'enhance the likelihood of 
settlement and resolution of the remaining 485 claims. (R. 2780.) To 
facilitate this, over Westgate's objections, CPG was allowed to try claims 
with disparate underlying facts so that 'each area [could] be appropriately 
adjudicated on a small scale' and to give rise either to iaw of the case, res 
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judicata . . . or a strong persuasive precedent to apply to the remaining 
claims.' (R. 2778.) 
(Westgate Brief, pp. 17-18.) 
The partial quotations are not from any ruling of the judge, as Westgate implies. 
Instead, they are lifted from a memorandum filed by CPG in 2005, three years before the 
consolidation. (In fact, Westgate does not even fairly convey what CPG said. See pp. 6-
7, supra) Before trial, CPG reiterated that it was not seeking to bind Westgate in future 
trials to the results of the first trial. (R. 4551). Westgate thus is flatly misleading the 
Court when it claims that "CPG was allowed to try claims with disparate underlying facts 
so that ceach area [could] be appropriately adjudicated on a small scale' and to give rise 
either to 'law of the case, res judicata...or a strong persuasive precedent to apply to the 
remaining claims.'" 
A party who fails to fairly characterize a trial court's rulings obviously has not 
shown that the court abused its discretion. Consolidation is quite context-specific: 
Consolidation has been described as a valuable and important tool of 
judicial administration. When properly used, it can streamline the pretrial 
proceedings, expedite the trial, avoid duplication of effort, and promote 
consistency. . . . In order to consolidate actions for any purpose, the court 
must first find that there are common questions of law or fact. Beyond that 
threshold showing, courts consider and weigh a variety of factors to 
determine whether consolidation is appropriate, including convenience, 
judicial economy, efficiency, and any prejudice. 
1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary, Steven S. Gensler, Rule 42 
(citations omitted); see also Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 
2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 (1964) (court could consolidate three separate condemnation 
proceedings involving three separate owners if it so chose); Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 1 
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Utah 2d 327, 325 P.2d 258 (1958) (consolidation of 11 actions involving 19 plaintiffs for 
trial was within court's discretion.) 
Westgate also has failed to establish that it was prejudiced by any alleged abuse of 
discretion in any event. Each claimant was required to prove each element of his or her 
claim. The jury was so instructed (R. 5667: Instruction 35: 2379-80), and the special 
verdict required individual findings for each set of consumers. The court likewise 
evaluated the sufficiency of evidence on an individualized basis, granting a directed 
verdict as to one couple, George and Darla Serassio, for example, due to insufficient 
evidence. (R. 5664: T. 1688.) 
Although Westgate argues that certain steps were not taken that were "necessary 
to protect against unfair prejudice," its only example is a case in which jurors were given 
"a notebook, tabbed for each plaintiff and each defendant, and during the presentation of 
evidence the jurors would be given time, as necessary, to make notes." (Westgate Brief, 
p. 19.) Westgate says that, "in stark contrast to the special care taken" in that case, the 
trial court here only "instructed] jurors that they could take notes but cautioned them not 
to 'overdo it and let your note taking distract you from following the evidence." Id., 20. 
That argument is borderline frivolous. Letting jurors take notes with an 
instruction to follow the evidence rather than give them tabbed notebooks (which 
Westgate never suggested), if even to be criticized, is "sufficiently inconsequential that. . 
. there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." 
Lee v. Langley, 2005 UT App 339, % 16, 121 P.3d 33; see also City ofHildale v. Cooke, 
2001UT56,TI30,28P.3d697. 
37 
Westgate argues that it was prejudiced because, "[a]s predicted by Westgate 
before trial, because the consumers each testified as to their own interactions with 
Westgate, the jury heard evidence about other alleged conduct it would not have heard 
had the cases been tried alone." (Westgate Brief at 10.) Westgate's entire analysis of this 
ruling or of U.R.E. 404(b) is a one sentence assertion that the evidence "tended only to 
show that Westgate's actions toward any particular consumer were in conformity with 
Westgate's general character." {Id., p. 20.) No, it showed that Westgate's actions were 
conformity with Westgate's general scheme, and its general intent. 
As CPG's counsel argued, even if the claims had been tried one at a time, 
evidence of other incidents would have been admissible, if not required, to establish 
elements of fraud such as intent, lack of mistake, etc.: 
MR. HUMPHERYS: . . . More importantly, let's assume we were to take 
one case at a time. What Counsel has overlooked and has not correctly 
stated, and that is in order to establish fraud we have to be able to show 
knowledge and intent, and that is typically not shown by one incident, 
unless it is absolutely clear. 
On the contrary, fraud and intent and corporate knowledge, which is a key 
factor in this, is shown by repetitive actions and the actions of the company 
toward those problems, because they then begin to show the knowledge of 
the company, the intent and the plan of the company to continue on. 
So even if this were bifurcated to be tried separately, we would still need to 
have the additional witnesses coming in that represent other claims to be 
able to show and present the intent and plan of Westgate to continue this 
fraud. 
(R. 5658: Transcript, September 30, 2008, Hearing, p. 77; See U.R.E. 404 (b) (evidence 
of other acts is admissible to prove "motive, . . . intent, preparation, plan, knowledge . . . 
or absence of mistake or accident. . . .") The trial court ruled that "CPG had a right to 
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show evidence of knowledge, intent and plan, pursuant to Rule of Evidence 404(b)" (R. 
5805-5806). Again, Westgate has not acknowledged or addressed this ruling on appeal. 
Westgate argues, in a single sentence: "In separate trials, Rule 403 would have 
prevented introduction of that evidence." (Westgate Brief, p. 20.) Why? No analysis is 
provided, and there is nothing to which CPG can respond. Under U.R.E. 103(a), "[e]rror 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected . . . ." Instead of attempting to establish 
prejudice, Westgate asks the Court to presume it from the fact that it lost. (Westgate 
Brief, p. 12 ("In support of its motion for JNOV, Westgate again raised arguments 
concerning consolidation and pointed out that the result of trial demonstrates the 
prejudice of consolidation.5'); p. 23 ("The punitive damages awards confirm that the 
unnecessary risk of prejudice translated into actual prejudice."). 
In criticizing the conduct of trial, Westgate says the court failed to "instruct the 
jury in a way adequate to counteract the merging of all the testimony to consider all the 
claims." (Westgate Brief, p. 11; also id ("These instructions were insufficient to mitigate 
the prejudice . . . .").) But Westgate never objected to the jury instructions, nor offered 
any instructions of its own that were rejected. In Utah, a party who stipulates to, fails to 
objects to, and/or fails to offer its own jury instruction has waived any right to claim error 
in the instructions. See p. 60, infra. 
In short, while Westgate might have preferred dragging consumers back into 
court, over and over, to tell the same story to jury after jury, Rule 42 allowed the court to 
avoid that waste of time and resources. No error has been shown. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
WESTGATE'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR 
REMITTITUR OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Westgate's second argument on appeal is that the punitive damages award 
infringes upon the federal constitution, and resulted from passion and prejudice. 
(Westgate Brief, pp. 23-46.) While the record is review de novo when punitive damages 
are at issue, parties are not thereby relieved of their briefing obligations under the Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. A de novo standard of review does not mean that parties may 
simply send the record up and expect the Court to start sifting. 
Under Rule 24(a)(7), Westgate was required to submit "a statement of the facts 
relevant to" the punitive damages issue, supported by citations to the record. Further, it 
was required to recite such facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Fairfax 
Realty, 2003 UT 41, % 3. Westgate has done neither. See Wright v. Westside Nursery, 
787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (declining "to make a thorough review of the 
whole record, which fills a box the size of an orange crate . . . . The very purpose of such 
devices as the 'marshaling' doctrine and R.Utah.Ct.App. 24(a)(7), requiring that all 
references in brief to factual matters 'be supported by citations to the record/ is to spare 
appellate courts such an onerous burden. Absent exceptional circumstances, our review 
of the record is limited to those specific portions of the record which have been drawn to 
our attention by the parties . . . ."); Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 
1546 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs."). 
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Apart from refusing to acknowledge any evidence supporting the verdict, or to 
recite any facts in a light favorable to the verdict, Westgate's challenge to the punitive 
damages claim fails on several other grounds. 
A. The verdict is not contrary to Utah state law. 
Westgate argues that punitive damages should be reduced to a 2-1 ratio under 
Utah state law, citing Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 809 (Utah 
1991) and Diversified Holdings, supra. No argument is made under the state 
constitution. 
It is logical to begin the analysis of punitive damages by reviewing what the jury 
was told to consider in awarding such damages. Westgate stipulated to these instructions: 
[75.] If you find that punitive damages are proper in this case, you may 
award such sum as, in your judgment, would be reasonable and proper as a 
punishment to the defendant for such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning 
to others not to offend in like manner. If such punitive damages are given, 
you should award them with caution and you should keep in mind that they 
are only for the purpose just mentioned and not the measure of actual 
damages. (R. 5668: 2636-37) 
[76.] If you award punitive damages against Westgate Resorts, in 
determining the amount of the award, you should take into account these 
factors: (i), the relative wealth of Westgate Resorts; (ii), the nature of the 
alleged misconduct; (iii), the facts and circumstances surrounding such 
conduct; (iv), the effect of the conduct on the lives of consumers and 
others; (v), the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi), the 
relationship of the parties; and, (vii), the amount of actual damages 
awarded. (R. 5668: Tr. 2637-38 [the "Crookston" factors].) 
Punitive damages reflect the amount of money that a factfinder concludes is 
needed to punish a defendant's misconduct, and to deter others from engaging in similar 
activities. In this case, the jury concluded that it would take $1,000,000 to send that 
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message to Westgate. Application of the seven Crookston factors (which "share some 
similarities" with the federal Gore factors, Fairfax Realty, ^ 31) supports the jury's 
conclusion. 
1. Wealth 
With respect to wealth, the jury heard evidence that Westgate Resorts' net wealth 
was about $500,000,000.00 in 2007. Westgate's CEO testified that the company's net 
equity had deteriorated substantially in 2008, but that the company intended to seek 
bailout money from the federal government. During the year before trial, Westgate 
Resorts generated approximately $1 billion in gross revenues. Westgate Resorts at the 
Canyons was a very profitable part of Westgate's operations. Within the first eight 
months, Westgate Resorts had generated $15 million in revenue from the resort, after 
which it remained steady or increased, annualized between $20 and $22 million in 
revenue. (Seep. 13,supra.) 
"An extremely wealthy defendant may require a larger award of punitive damages 
to be deterred from further misconduct[.]" Diversified Holdings, f 15. Westgate's brief 
acknowledges this Court's previous citation to the Seventh Circuit's observation that "a 
typical punitive damages award may be around one percent of the defendant's net worth." 
Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT 41, p 3 (citing Cash v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 900 F.2d 109, 111 
n.3 (7th Cir. 1990)). Although one might argue that the punitive damages in this case 
were too low under that standard, it is certainly understandable, based on the Westgate's 
relative wealth, that the jury believed a large number would be required to meaningfully 
punish Westgate. 
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2. Nature of misconduct 
The nature of Westgate's misconduct, the second prong of the Crookston test, was 
a longstanding, highly profitable, deliberately fraudulent scheme. "Deliberate false 
statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, [and] concealment of evidence of improper 
motive" support more substantial awards, as do acts involving 'trickery and deceit/" 
Fairfax Realty, f 35 (citations omitted). 
Ignoring the jury's finding of fraud, its own project manager's acknowledgement 
that the Anaheim Cert was intentionally designed for "breakage," and all testimony by 
the consumers about their experiences, Westgate describes CPG's claims against it as 
involving nothing more than "the difficulty some people experienced in redeeming the 
$500 certificates—certificates provided to them by an independent contractor hired by 
Westgate." (Westgate Brief, p. 2.; also id., p. 4 ("Some people found that the 
independent contractor made it difficult to redeem the certificates.").) 
Adding insult to injury, Westgate argued at trial that, even though its letter 
specifically promised "an Anaheim California vacation," a "trip," a "vacation package" 
including air fare and accommodations, Westgate's only obligation to the consumers was 
to provide a "certificate" for a vacation, not an actual vacation. (See R. 5664: Tr. 1672; 
R. 5667: Tr. 2505.) 
Westgate's continued deflection to the "independent contractor" disregards 
evidence from which the jury could have found Westgate itself blameworthy, rather than 
simply a hapless victim of some unrelated entity. E.g., pp. 14-20, 21-23, 25-27, supra; R. 
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5668: Tr. 2578-2581 (Westgate counsel acknowledging that the jury might have based 
punitive damages on the misconduct of Westgate's own employees, not of agents). 
Westgate's counsel told the jury that it could find against Westgate either for the 
actions of its employees, or, if certain elements were met, for the actions of an agent. (R. 
5668: T. 2655-2656.) Either way, the jury found it appropriate and necessary to assess 
punitive damages against Westgate. 
3. Facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct 
The next prong, the facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct, is 
summarized in the statement of facts above. In essence, Westgate promised people 
something it had no intention of providing. When it got caught, it attempted to shift 
blame to others, including the consumers themselves and the attorneys who have worked 
for seven years to expose the misconduct. (R. 5668: Tr. 2662 (Phase II) (Epstein: "The 
probability of future recurrence, zero. There's nothing that can be achieved, other than 
the lawyers and others making profits that are off of the back of these consumers to 
awarding a large amount of punitive damages when there's nothing to punish, when 
there's no future conduct to deter and when the message is not going to be heard by 
anybody.").) 
4, Effect of misconduct on the consumers and others 
The effect of Westgate's conduct on the consumers and others is what one would 
expect from being victimized by a fraudulent scheme. Although the jury chose not to 
award general damages, the consumers' testimony regarding their frustrations, 
disillusionment, and anger is properly considered on this element. Every time intentional 
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fraud is committed by a well-known entity that portrays itself as a solid citizen, 
consumers lose more confidence in the integrity of the corporate world and in their fellow 
residents. 
5. Motive 
The sole motive behind the scheme was profit. It may not have escaped the jury's 
attention that Westgate at the Canyons was the only resort to use the "Anaheim vacation" 
ploy, and was also one of the more successful locations. It is also reasonable to infer that, 
because of the relatively low dollar amount at issue, Westgate assumed that no consumers 
could afford, or would have the fortitude, to do anything in response to being defrauded. 
6. Likelihood of recurrence 
As the trial court observed, the jury likely concluded that the probability of 
recurrence is high. (R. 5804 "(P]t was proper for the jury to infer from the evidence that 
Westgate had a calloused attitude toward the Consumers, and that such attitude means 
that Westgate would be willing to defraud others.").) Several considerations support that 
conclusion. 
Remorse - or lack thereof - is a predictor of recidivism. See Campbell v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. {Campbell IV), 98 P.3d 409, 2004 UT 34, ffl[ 29, 35 (after 
noting that State Farm had "not voiced so much as a whisper of apology or remorse," 
observing, "We . . . find ample grounds to defend an award of punitive damages in the 
upper range permitted by due process based on our concern that State Farm's defiance 
strongly suggests that it will not hesitate to treat its Utah insureds with the callousness 
that marked its treatment of the Campbells") {citing Diversified Holdings) (identifying 
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chief aggravating factor in an award of punitive damages as "a lack of remorse increasing 
the likelihood of recidivism")); Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 186 P.3d 
1012, 2008 UT App 207, |^ 27-28 (one factor supporting punitive damages award was 
that defendant "has never shown remorse for his actions[.]") 
In this case, both the jury and the court could properly consider the utter refusal of 
Westgate or any of its witnesses to acknowledge any impropriety, at trial or afterward, 
and its continued insistence of blaming the consumers themselves. "Where is the 
deplorable behavior?" Westgate lamented in its post-trial motions. (R. 4918.) It has been 
punished for "acts of unquestioned prudence and good business practice," it said. Id. 
This utter lack of contrition - indeed, outright combativeness - was replete throughout 
Westgate's post-trial briefing. Even after hearing consumer after consumer lay out their 
tribulations, Westgate refused to acknowledge even that MDI or NRC committed 
misconduct. See R. 4917 (arguing that Westgate "has been held accountable to the tune 
of $1,000,000 for the perceived wrong doing of others") (emphasis added). 
Even now, Westgate seeks to smear the victims by claiming that "several were 
savvy enough to try to 'game the system' by claiming their gifts without even considering 
the purchase of a Westgate timeshare, a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing." (Westgate Brief, p. 40). But Westgate's invitation (Confirmation Letter) 
expressly told consumers they had no obligation to purchase: 
An informative and relaxing timeshare sales presentation that lasts 
approximately 90 minutes. There is absolutely no purchase required to 
obtain your gift. This is our way of saying thank you for joining us and 
sharing your valued time and opinions about our resort. At the end of your 
presentation you will receive your choice of [gift]... 
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It is incredible - but typical - for Westgate to attack consumers for believing 
exactly what Westgate told them. 
Westgate argued to the trial court that a[r]ecidivism is clearly unlikely here 
because Westgate completely ceased offering the Anaheim Cert in 2002 and has no plans 
to use such a certificate in the future." (R. 4872.) Significantly, however, it only stopped 
using the highly profitable certificate when it got caught, i.e., when it learned that this 
lawsuit was imminent. (See pp. 25-26, supra.)9 
7. Amount of actual damages awarded 
Westgate devotes most of its attention to the seventh element that the jury was 
instructed to consider, i.e., the amount of actual damages awarded. Crookston does 
indicate that, as a starting point, a punitive damage award exceeding a ratio of 3 to 1 
should be more closely scrutinized than one below that ratio. However, the Crookston 
ratios have little or no application to cases in which compensatory damages are small. 
Before addressing that key point, an initial observation is appropriate regarding the 
ratio. Although it is not dispositive, Westgate has made an odd argument that the ratio 
denominator is only $242, not $7,242. (Westgate Brief, p. 5, 24 n. 5.) To get there, it 
asks the Court to subtract the value of the promised trip itself ($500). Westgate argues: 
Westgate's citations (R. 5668: T. 2613) did not preclude future use of such 
certificates; the witness actually said that Westgate does not "now" use air-inclusive 
certificates, and that it does not have plans "at this point in time" to use certificates on 
which it does not control the fulfillment process. (R. 5668: T. 2614-2615.) In any event, 
the jury was not required to believe the convenient testimony of Westgate5s 
representative on this point. 
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The court distinguished contract and fraud damages in the special verdict 
form when it awarded pre-judgment interest under Utah Code section 15-1-
(2) only as to "each $500 award." (R. 4818.) Under section 15-1-1, pre-
judgment interest is appropriate only for damages resulting from breach of 
contract, not from tort. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (setting pre-judgment 
interest at 10% for claims where the contract does not specify a different 
rate). Thus, $500 of each of the 15 claims represents only contract 
damages. 
(/</., p. 24 n. 5.) 
Westgate misreads (and misquotes) Section 15-1-1. The statute provides that, 
"unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of 
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% 
per annum." There is no contract between the parties specifying a different rate; hence, 
prejudgment interest is 10 percent. 
Westgate claims that pre-judgment interest is only available for contract claims, 
not torts, but a century of Utah case law says otherwise: "Prejudgment interest may be 
recovered where the damage is complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular 
time, and the loss is measurable by facts and figures. Prejudgment interest is appropriate 
when 'the loss has been fixed as of a definite time and the amount of the loss can be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of 
damages"7 Encon Utah LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 210 P3d 263, pi (Utah 
2009); Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P.1003 (1907). 
Westgate5s counsel admitted at trial, "[W]e have testimony as to the value of the 
trip that was supposedly represented, we have testimony and evidence of the receipt 
showing that the value or some value, the $500, was attributed to it. We also have a 
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witness, an expert, who testified that, in fact, the value was far less. . . . The expert has 
said that the value of what they actually received was far less, say zero." (R. 5663: T. 
1637.) A proper measure of economic loss in fraud cases is the benefit of the bargain, the 
difference between the value of the item received ($0) and the value the item would have 
had if the defendant's representations had been true ($500). Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 
602, 609 (Utah 1974). 
In any event, as discussed further infra, the relevance of the "ratio" consideration 
dissipates when in cases with small compensatory damages. As this Court has 
recognized, there are some similarities between the "Crookston factors" for purposes of 
claimed excessiveness under U.R.Civ.P. 59 and the "Gore guideposts" for purposes of 
claimed excessiveness under the Constitution. Fairfax Realty, supra, % 31. It is therefore 
instructive to note that, in the context of constitutional analysis, virtually all courts, 
including the United States Supreme Court, have agreed that the "ratio" factor has limited 
or no application in cases where the compensatory damages are small. 
Not surprisingly, ratios of punitive-to-compensatory damages awards are often 
hundreds or thousands to one when the compensatory award is small. Defendants who 
seek to apply a single-digit ratio to low compensatory damages have consistently been 
rebuffed, largely because of the absurd and counterproductive results that would obtain. 
In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miell, 569 F.Supp.2d 841 (N.D. Iowa 
2008), for example, the defendant argued that only a single-digit ratio was permitted even 
though the plaintiff had only been awarded $1 dollar in compensatory damages. That 
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outcome would be both illogical and contrary to the Supreme Court's recent 
pronouncements, the court observed: 
If a single digit multiplier was applied in this case, Plaintiff would receive 
$1.00 in nominal damages and, at most, $9.00 in punitive damages. This 
somewhat ridiculous outcome demonstrates why multipliers in these types 
of cases are not appropriate. As the Supreme Court recently stated in 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, "the consensus today is that punitive damages 
are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring 
harmful conduct." — U.S. — , — , 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2621, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 
(2008). "Heavier punitive damages awards have been thought to be 
justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect . . . , or when the value of 
injury and corresponding compensatory award are small. . . . " Id. at 2622. 
Id., 578 F.Supp.2d at 1284 (ellipses in original). 
While Westgate cites Exxon in its memorandum, it does not mention the clear 
distinction drawn by the United States Supreme Court in that case between cases with 
large compensatory damages ($507 million in Exxon), wherein a smaller ratio is 
appropriate, and cases with small and/or difficult to detect damages, in which larger 
ratios are appropriate. 
Other courts have consistently recognized this distinction, and the corresponding 
limited relevance of "ratios" in low-damage cases. With apologies for the lengthy string 
cite, see, e.g., Saunders v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. of Virginia, 526 F.3d 142, 154 
(4th Cir. 2008) (involving a single violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act where the 
plaintiff received $1,000 in statutory damages and $80,000 in punitive damages. In 
upholding an 1:80 ration, the court stated the "Supreme Court has long recognized that 
greater ratios may comport with due process, however, when reprehensible conduct 
results in only a small amount of economic damages."); JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters 
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Bank NA, 539 F.3d 862, 876-77 (8th Cir. 2008) (involving a single trespass where the 
plaintiff received nominal damages and $108,750 in punitive damages. The court 
reasoned that "[pjunitive damages may withstand constitutional scrutiny when only 
nominal or small amount of compensatory damages have been assigned, even though the 
ratio between the two will necessarily be large."); Mendez v. County of San Bernadino, 
540 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) Gustifying a ratio of 2,500 to 1, for a single civil 
rights violation. In justifying the ratio, the court cited to the United States Supreme Court 
decision of Campbell where it states "ratios greater than those we have previously upheld 
may comport with due process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a 
small amount of economic damages"'' 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (emphasis added)); 
Myers v. Workmen's Auto Insurance Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977, 992 (2004) 
(upholding $300,000 punitive damage award on compensatory damages of $735 (ratio: 
408 to 1); "It should be observed that ratios of compensatory damages and punitive 
damages are of no real assistance in this case were only nominal damages are sought. A 
punitive damage award tied to some ratio would almost certainly have none of the 
salutary effects sought to be achieved by a punitive damage award"); Diversified Water 
Diversion, Inc. v. Standard Water Control Systems, 2008 WL 4300258 (Minn.App. 2008) 
("The nature of the relationship between a punitive- and compensatory-damage award 
when only nominal compensatory damages are found differs from the circumstances 
presented in Gore and Campbell Taking their cue from this fact and the flexibility 
allowed by the Supreme Court in Gore an d Campbell, numerous courts from other 
jurisdictions have upheld comparatively significant punitive-damage awards even when 
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only nominal compensatory damages were awarded. These courts have generally 
justified this result by significantly deemphasizing, if not disregarding, the importance of 
the proportionality guidepost when nominal compensatory damages are found"; 
upholding $30,000 punitive damage award with only $1 in compensatory damages) 
(ratio: 30,000 to 1), and cases cited; Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 170 F.3d 
1320, 1338-1339 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding $4.35 million punitive damage award on 
$47,000 compensatory damages (ratio: 92 to 1); "substantial punitive damages are 
warranted for deterrence and, since the actual damages are quite small, must be 
somewhat disproportionate to the actual damage award"). See also Ellis v. La Vecchia, 
567 F.Supp.2d 601, 610-611 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (higher ratio is appropriate with small 
damages; upholding $2,600 punitive damage award on $1 compensatory damages) (ratio: 
2600 to 1); Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1014, 1016 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that a "'ratio analysis' cannot be applied effectively" in cases with low damages; 
upholding $15,000 in punitive damages on $100 compensatory damages) (ratio: 150 to 
1); Hadelman v. DeLuca, 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 60, 2003 WL 21493968 (Conn. Super. 2003) 
(upholding punitive damage award of $150,000 on award of zero compensatory damages 
(ratio: infinite); where little or no compensatory damages are awarded, "the ratio will 
always be infinite or a huge multiple"), and cases cited. 
The damages in this case were roughly $500 for each set of Consumers, for a total 
compensatory award of $7,242.00. Westgate previously claimed that a $1 million 
punitive damage is "breathtaking" (R. 4904), but it would have been more breathtaking if 
the jury had found an intentionally fraudulent scheme with multiple incidents over time 
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by a billion-dollar company, yet only awarded $14,484 in punitive damages, not even a 
blip on Westgate's radar. Such an award would have been .00003 (.003 percent) of 
Westgate's net worth in 2007, and .0007 of Westgate's yearly sales at the Resort.10 
If its punitive damages exposure were limited as Westgate urges, it would have 
been virtually impossible for Westgate's misconduct to be brought to light, or to an end. 
As Judge Posner observed regarding a low-damage claims in Mathias v. Accor Economy 
Lodging Inc., 347 F.2d 672, 676-677 (7th Cir. 2003), had the defendant's similar 
argument been accepted, 
the plaintiffs might well have had difficulty financing this lawsuit. It is 
here that the defendant's aggregate net worth of $1.6 billion becomes 
relevant. . . . Where wealth in the sense of resources enters is in enabling 
the defendant to mount an extremely aggressive defense against suits such 
as this and by doing so to make litigating against it very costly, which in 
turn may make it difficult for the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to 
handle their case, involving as it does only modest stakes, for the usual 33-
40 percent contingent fee. 
As it is, the punitive damage award in this case is less than two-tenths of one 
percent of Westgate's net wealth as of 2007, and between one-half and three-quarters of 
one percent of Westgate's claimed wealth as of the date of trial. It is one-tenth of one 
percent of Westgate's annual gross revenues, and only 5 percent of the annual gross 
revenues just at the Canyons resort. 
When viewed from that perspective, the award actually seems low - less than one 
percent of a company's net equity (assuming no bailout funds) does not seem likely to 
deter highly profitable fraudulent conduct. Stiffer punches have been upheld by this 
10
 At 3-1, $21,726 in punitives would have been .000043 of Westgate's net worth in 
2007, and .001 of Westgate's yearly sales at the Resort. 
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Court. See, e.g., Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, ffif 27-
28, 186 P.3d 1012 (upholding punitive damage award of $34,000 against defendant 
whose annual income was $40,000 and net worth $12,000); Fairfax Realty, supra 
(upholding punitive damages award equaling 15 percent of the defendant's wealth); 
Diversified Holdings at f33 (reducing a punitive damage award to 2.86% of the 
defendant's net worth). 
Westgate argues that this case is similar to Diversified Holdings, in which the 
Court reduced a punitive damage award. Punitive damages are inherently case specific, 
however, and the concerns in that case are not present here. For example, in Diversified 
Holdings, only a single transaction was involved. Id., ^2. The award was 10 percent of 
the defendant's net worth. \ 15. The victim was "a corporation, represented in [the] 
transaction by two men with substantial experience in both business and real estate 
transactions." % 16. The defendant's fraud was directed at only a small number of 
people. |^ 20. This case is not Diversified Holdings, and the jury's punitive damages 
verdict is not excessive under Utah law. 
B. The punitive damages award does not violate the United 
States constitution. 
1. Gore factors 
Because significant overlap exists between the state (Crookston) and federal 
(Gore) factors, much of the foregoing discussion bears on the federal analysis as well. 
The U.S Supreme Court has set forth three "guideposts" for aiding the Court in 
reviewing constitutional challenges to punitive damages awards: 1) the reprehensibility 
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of the conduct; 2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages; and 3) civil 
penalties that could be assessed for the misconduct under state law. BMW v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559,116 S.Ct 1589(1996). 
Westgate's principal focus is, again, the second factor, mathematical ratio between 
the total compensatory damages award and the total punitive damages award. That ratio, 
Westgate says, is 138 to 1 (or 4100 to 1 if the $500 damages for the vacation were carved 
out). (The error of that contention is addressed, supra.) As discussed above, however, 
punitive damages awards in cases involving low compensatory damages are consistently 
upheld with far greater ratios. See pp. 50-52, supra. 
The other two guideposts do not aid Westgate, either. "The most important 
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the reprehensibility of the 
defendant's conduct." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.408, 419, 
123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003). In assessing reprehensibility, the Court should consider, among 
other things, whether "the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident," 
and whether "the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere 
accident." Id. Westgate's conduct in this case falls within both categories. It was 
deliberate deceit, and not an isolated incident. See Exxon, supra (repeatedly emphasizing 
that there was no evidence of profit motive or intentional misconduct in that case). 
In its defense, Westgate can only claim that the consumers were not financially 
vulnerable, that there was no fiduciary relationship, and that, somehow, "Westgate's 
conduct should be construed to involve isolated incidents in light of the fact that 500 
individual claims are being prosecuted." (Westgate Brief, p. 31.) Only by ignoring 
55 
virtually every piece of evidence at trial can Westgate claim that a resort-wide scheme 
involving 2,300 identical fraudulent certificates was an "isolated" incident.11 
The third Gore guidepost is the range of civil penalties that could have been 
imposed under state law for the misconduct. Westgate's memorandum mentions a few: 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act, which would allow for $2,000 per claim; the 
Division of Consumer Protection could fine Westgate up to $1,000; the Utah pattern of 
Unlawful Activities Act, which would allow for twice the damages sustained (plus 
attorney fees, not mentioned by Westgate). 
Glaringly absent from Westgate's recitation of statutory penalties is Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-19-3(a), a "death penalty" for timeshare companies who engage in fraudulent 
marketing tactics. Section § 57-19-3(a) specifically provided (and still provides) that the 
registration of a timeshare company to do business in Utah may be revoked if "the 
developer's advertising or sales techniques or trade practices have been or are deceptive, 
false, or misleading[.]" That would have cost Westgate $20 million per year, far more 
than the jury's punishment. See p. , supra. Westgate cannot claim that "nothing 
in Utah statutes provided notice of the possibility of a $1 million penalty" (Westgate 
Brief, p. 33) when it knew that engaging in "deceptive, false, or misleading" sales tactics 
could have multi-million-dollar consequences.12 
11
 Westgate's implications that the consumers were sophisticated and/or wealthy are also 
exaggerated. (Westgate Brief, pp. 13, 31.) Westgate targeted consumers with $50,000 in 
total family income, hardly in the same league as Westgate. (Trial Exh. S.) 
Westgate suggests several times that, if the court "extrapolated" from this verdict, it 
could view Westgate as having been penalized $33 million. In this context, extrapolation 
is synonymous with speculation: It assumes that punitive damages would be sought in 
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2- Harm to others 
Westgate argues that the jury's verdict runs afoul of Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 459 U.S. 346, 349, 353-355 (2007). Philip Morris said that, while a jury can 
be informed of and consider harm to others in evaluating reprehensibility, it cannot 
punish a defendant for harm inflicted upon strangers to the litigation. Id. at 353. 
Westgate argues: "Where the likelihood of punishing third parties is present, it is 
constitutionally inadequate for a trial court to rely on that language alone to ensure that 
the jury was cnot asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking not simply to determine 
reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused to strangers.'" (Westgate Brief, p. 
36.) 
The problem with Westgate5s argument is threefold. First, as noted above, the 
jury instruction that Westgate says created this "likelihood of punishing third parties" is 
one to which Westgate stipulated. A party cannot complain about an instruction to which 
it stipulated, or failed to object. 
Relatedly, Westgate is precluded from challenging the verdict on this ground 
because it did not request a "Philip Morris" instruction. Miell, supra, 569 F.Supp.2d at 
850-851 (defendant cannot challenge verdict on Philip Morris grounds unless it requested 
a jury instruction on that issue); Kauffman v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., 509 
F.Supp.2d 210, 214-215 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (same; noting that Philip Morris says a trial 
subsequent trials, that the trial court would submit such damages to the jury, that 
Westgate would not be permitted to tell the jury about the prior award, etc. While it is 
understandable that Westgate would prefer to challenge a much bigger but non-existent 
award, the only judgment before the court is for $1 million. 
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court must, "upon request," provide such an instruction); Rinehart v. Shelter General 
Insurance Co., 261 S.W.3d 583, 597-598 (Mo. App. 2008), application for transfer to 
Supreme Court denied; Modern Management Co. v. Wilson, 997 A.2d 37, 53 (D.C. App. 
2010); Fairfax Realty, supra, ^ 30 n. 12 (right to constitutional review of a punitive 
damage award "may be waived or forfeited like many other constitutional rights."). 
Enforcing these established rules of waiver is important in several respects. Both 
CPG's counsel and the court relied on Westgate's stipulation in their argument and 
rulings. (See, e.g., R. 5668: T. 2646-2649.) If the instruction were erroneous as 
Westgate apparently contends, it was invited error, and allowing Westgate to raise the 
issue now would severely prejudice CPG. Tschaggeny v. MilbankIns. Co., 2007 UT 37, 
Tf 12, 163 P.3d 615 ("The invited error doctrine prevents a party from taking 'advantage 
of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
error.'"). 
"[U]nder the doctrine of invited error, we have declined to engage in even plain 
error review when 'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the 
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings].'" State v. Winfield, 2006 
UT 4, % 14, 128 P.3d 1171, 1175 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). "Our invited 
error doctrine arises from the principle that 'a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'" Id. at % 
15 (citation omitted). 
More fundamentally, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that state 
courts have an important interest in enforcing their established rules. An example is the 
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Philip Morris case itself. In 2007, the Supreme Court vacated a large punitive damage 
award against Philip Morris, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state 
from using punitive damages to punish for harms to nonparties. 549 U.S. 346. 
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that "there is a preliminary, 
independent state law standard that we must consider, before we address the 
constitutional standard that the United States Supreme Court has articulated." Williams v. 
Philip Morris Inc., 344 Or. 45, 176 P.3d 1255, 1260. The court concluded that under 
state law, Philip Morris waived its right to challenge the trial court's instruction of the 
jury, because it failed to proffer an instruction consistent with the requirements of Oregon 
law. Id. at 1260-1263. Accordingly, it affirmed the original punitive damage award. Id. 
at 1264. 
Philip Morris filed a petition for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court 
initially granted. The parties' briefing centered on whether the Oregon Supreme Court 
was permitted to apply its own waiver rules to a federal constitutional challenge. 
http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php? 
(accessed December 17, 2010). (Philip Morris also argued that the waiver rule was not 
"firmly established" or "regularly followed." Id.) 
Oral argument centered around the same inquiry, a state's legitimate interest in 
applying its own, well-established principles of waiver, even if doing so allegedly 
sustains a federal constitutional violation. See Addendum Exh. 3. After argument, the 
court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. Id. 
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Unlike Philip Morris, where the cited rule had rarely been invoked, there is no 
debate here as to the vitality of Utah's waiver rules. Utah appellate courts have held 
dozens of times in recent years alone that a party who stipulates to a jury instruction, who 
fails to object to in instruction, or who fails to proffer its own instruction cannot 
thereafter claim error on appeal. See list of cases attached hereto as Addendum Exh. 4. 
In light of the prejudice resulting from invited error, CPG respectfully submits that 
applying these settled principles to Westgate's argument is critical. 
CPG also notes that, even without a proffered instruction from Westgate, the trial 
court essentially gave the jury guidance on its own. The entire exchange that occurred 
during Mr. Humpherys5 closing argument (contrasted with Westgate's excerpt) makes 
clear the limited purpose for which the Court permitted reference to other consumers: 
At the point of closing argument at which Westgate objected, counsel was 
addressing the fourth of the seven Crookston considerations delineated in the jury 
instruction to which Westgate had stipulated. See R. 5668: T. 2646-2647 (Mr. 
Humpherys: "In the Jury Instruction, Your Honor, one of the things that the jury must 
consider is item Number 4, the effect of the conduct on the lives of the consumers and 
others. I'm addressing that very thing."). 
In front of the jury, Westgate asked the Court whether counsel would be allowed 
to "argue that punitive damages can be awarded for the entire group of people that might 
have been affected by this particular premium incentive program; is that right?" (R. 
5668: T. 2648 (Epstein).) The Court then stated that counsel's argument would be 
limited to the items in the stipulated jury instruction: "He may argue the facts and 
60 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, the nature of the alleged conduct, the relative 
wealth of Westgate Resorts, the effect of the conduct on the lives of the consumers and 
others, the probability of future recurrence and misconduct, the relationship of the parties 
and the amount of actual damages awarded. As long as he's confined to that, that's the 
Instruction 76 relative to punitive damages." (R. 5668: T. 2648-2649.) 
On its own, therefore, the trial court limited consideration of counsel's reference to 
other consumers to the purposes delineated in Instruction 76, to which Westgate 
stipulated. Moreover, Westgate had an opportunity to tell the jury its own view as to the 
limited scope of Instruction 76, and it did so. (R. 5668: T. 2663.) 
Westgate has not shown that the jury's verdict was based upon improper 
considerations. Under Philip Morris, a jury can consider harm to others for the purpose 
of determining reprehensibility. See id., Ill S.Ct. at 1063 (reaffirming that plaintiff may 
show harm to non-parties to demonstrate "a different part of the punitive damages 
constitutional equation, namely, reprehensibility") and id. ("harm to others shows more 
reprehensible conduct"). 
Westgate claims that the sheer size of the jury's award, the identical awards, and 
the award of punitive damages to Mr. Davis, who (eventually) travelled, must have meant 
that the jury punished Westgate for harm to nonparties. (Westgate Brief, p. 36.) But with 
this set of facts, it is more likely that the jury followed stipulated Instruction 75, Punitive 
Damages as Punishment: 
If you find that punitive damages are proper in this case, you may award 
such sum as, in your judgment, would be reasonable and proper as a 
punishment to the defendant for such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning 
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to others not to offend in like manner. If such punitive damages are given, 
you should award them with caution and you should keep in mind that they 
are only for the purpose just mentioned and not the measure of actual 
damages. (R. 5668: 2636-37) 
The jury, knowing the facts of the case and familiar with Westgate's wealth, 
conduct, and attitude, chose a figure of $1,000,000 as necessary and sufficient to punish 
Westgate and serve as a warning to others. Following Instruction 75, the jury did not 
tailor each award to the minor variations in consumers' actual damages, it simply divided 
the punitive number by fifteen. 
$1 million was a reasonable assessment of what it would take to fulfill the 
purposes of punitive damages in light of Westgate's conduct toward the fifteen 
consumers whose claims were tried. Any suggestion that the jury's verdict includes 
punishment of Westgate for harm caused to non-parties is purely speculative, but 
Westgate would have only itself to blame if it did. 
Westgate complains that references were made by three consumers to "900 
people," "hundreds or 1000 people," or "1000; 10,000 misled Consumers," and which 
CPG's counsel allegedly referenced improperly during closing argument. (Westgate 
Brief, p. 9.) With respect to the consumer references, Westgate disregards the court's 
response. On R. 5660: T. 508, for example, a witness did mention, unsolicited, that if he 
had received his trip, "there wouldn't be 1,000 of us consumers out there, or 10,000 of us 
that had been misled—", at which point CPG's counsel immediately cut him off. The 
13
 Westgate's assumption that the jury was otherwise inflamed is contradicted by the fact 
that the jurors, despite counsel's urging, calmly rejected every consumer's claim of 
emotional distress and general damages. (R. 4802: Verdict.) 
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court struck the reference, to which the jury was unlikely to give credence anyway, as it 
knew that the entire number of certificates that MDI had provided Westgate was nowhere 
near 10,000. The court also struck the other two cited references, R. 5660: T. 560, T. 
762. 
In any event, any alleged prejudice from a few isolated comments in a 10-day trial 
was mooted when the court found that Westgate had opened the door to information 
regarding other consumers by affirmatively eliciting testimony from witness David 
Wagner about an alleged lack of a high level of complaints about the Anaheim certificate. 
(See R. 5662: Wagner: 1114-1115; e.g., id: 1022-1024, 1049 ("I don't remember ever 
having any reason to discontinue it [the travel certificate]. That would have been if there 
was problems, and I don't believe that that occurred."), R. 5662: T. 1056-1059 (testimony 
regarding "small number" of problems with certificate, including that "I have never had 
at any of my locations nationwide any high level of bad customer experience or 
complaints using the NRC products"), R. 5662: T. 10K0-1082 (eliciting testimony about 
"any discussions that you had with any of the management or executive level employees 
of Westgate that involved the performance of the Anaheim certificate, complaints about 
redemption or anything like that" and "small amounts" of complaints reported by NRC). 
CPG was entitled to question the basis and legitimacy ol that key aspect of Westgate's 
defense. 
CROSS APPEAL 
Pursuant to its conditional cross-appeal, Consumer Protection Group requests the 
Court to rule on the following issues only if the court reverses the trial court's judgment. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT CLAIMS 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT 
ARE NOT ASSIGNABLE. 
Early in the case, the trial court dismissed the claims asserted by CPG under the 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-11, et seq. CPG lacked 
standing to assert the claims, the court ruled, because the statute permits only 
"consumers" to bring claims, and thus such claims cannot be brought by an assignee. (R. 
2340.) With respect, the trial court erred. 
It is well established in Utah that choses in action are assignable. Time Finance 
Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., 23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d 873 (1969) ("the right to the 
proceeds was a chose in action, which could be assigned as any other chose in action"). 
Assignability extends to choses in action derived from statute. Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 
193, 63 P.2d 611 (1936); see also 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 49 ("Whether a claim is 
statutory is not determinative of its assignability or survivability"). 
In Mayer, this Court noted that "[t]he trend of judicial opinion has been to enlarge 
rather than to restrict the causes that may be assigned." Id., 63 P.2d at 616. Consistent 
with that principle, Utah courts have recognized the assignability of claims or benefits 
unless a statute expressly prohibits it (which the UCSPA does not do). See, e.g., Florida 
Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Commission, 2004 UT App 273, ffl| 12-13, 18, 22, 
98 P.3d 436 (absent express prohibition, workers' statutory compensation benefits are 
assignable by worker upon receipt); see also State v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 885-886 (Utah 
1996) (judgment for past-due court-ordered child support is assignable); In re Behm's 
Estate v. Gee, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950) (even if cause of action for wrongful 
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death was not itself assignable, individual heir's portion of the death claim was 
assignable). 
Claims for fraud are assignable in Utah, and an assignee of such claims possesses 
legal standing to pursue them in court. Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 
2003 UT App 316, ffl| 29-30, 78 P.3d 616, affirmed on other grounds, Russell Packard 
Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741 (addressing discovery rule under 
statute of limitations), citing Mayer, supra. 
The fact that a cause of action is extended under the UCSPA to "consumers" is no 
more a bar to assignment than the fact that a cause of action for fraud is extended under 
the common law to a person who has reasonably relied upon a misrepresentation to his 
detriment. In both instances, the original claimant is simply required to meet certain 
criteria in order to have a chose in action to assign. 
The UCSPA claims assigned to CPG allege that Westgate engaged in "deceptive 
acts or practices" (Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4), essentially a form of statutory fraud. 
There is no indication in Utah law that the court would apply a different standard for 
assignability depending on whether the fraud is actionable under the common law or 
pursuant to statute. Indeed, Russell/Packard suggests otherwise. hat case, the Court 
of Appeals found the plaintiffs common law fraud claim "indistinguishable" from 
Mayer, which involved a statutory action to recover on a bond for fraud committed by a 
securities dealer. See also Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 972 (IJtah 
1982) (pleading requirements of R ule 9 are not "limited to allegatioi i of common-law 
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fraud," but include all circumstances involving "the kind of misrepresentations, 
omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term 'fraud5 in its broadest dimension"). 
Nowhere in the Act does the legislature prohibit the assignment of UCSPA claims. 
A valid assignment confers upon the assignee standing to sue in the place of the assignor. 
Moreover, Westgate successfully opposed CPG's motion to add the individual assignors, 
in part based upon the argument that the consumers had assigned their claims to CPG 
under the UCSPA. (R. 2745.) Having obtained that relief, Westgate should be held to its 
position. 
IV. IF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD IS MODIFIED OR 
REVERSED, THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF 
ATTORNEY FEES TO CPG SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 
RECONSIDERATION. 
In the court below, CPG sought attorney fees on various grounds. The trial court 
denied CPG's motion. With respect to CPG's argument under the private attorney 
general doctrine, however, the trial court's denial was based upon the fact that the 
punitive damage award addressed the considerations raised by CPG: "Many of the 
arguments CPG made in favor of the private attorney general doctrine also relate to its 
plea for this court to uphold the punitive damages award. Thus, the issue does not need 
to be revisited. The goals of deterrence and punishment are met by the punitive damages 
award." (R. 5801.) 
If the punitive damage is modified or amended, the trial court should be given an 
opportunity to revisit the attorney fee issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellee Consumer Protection Group respectfully 
requests the Court affirm the trial court's judgment. In the alternative only, CPG requests 
the Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of CPG's claims under ihe I Hah Consumer 
Sales Practices Act. 
DATED this 17th day of December, 2010. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
L. Rich Humphei|ys\ 
Karra J. Porter 
Scot A. Boyd 
Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Appellees 
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SHAUN S. ADEL, an individual, and 
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LLC, a Utah limited company, 
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RULING 
Case No. 020404068 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff's motion to dismiss counts five and six of 
the defendant's counterclaim. The Court has reviewed the file, the memoranda filed by the parties, 
and the relevant case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised, issues the following: 
RULING 
Sometime in August 2002, Defendant Shaun S. Adel formed Consumer Protection Group, 
LLC ("CPG") to solicit claims under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA") against 
Plaintiff Westgate Resorts, Ltd. ("Westgate") from Westgate costumers. (Counterclaim ^ f 17.) 
CPG sent some 1,989 identical letters to Westgate customers advising them that they may have 
been defrauded by Westgate, that certain practices by Westgate were unlawfiil under the UCSPA, 
and that they may be entitled to $2,000.00 or more under the UCSPA. (Counterclaim f 17; CPG 
Letter f^  1,3.) The letter then informed the costumers that CPG had already invested time and 
resources to bring such claims to court and solicited their individual claims. (CPG Letter <| 4.) 
The letter also informed those who had purchased timeshares from Westgate that CPG would 
send an additional letter describing their potential case against Westgate for fraud in inducing the 
sale of timeshares. (CPG Letter f 6.) Enclosed with the letters were pre-prepared affidavits and 
assignment forms for Westgate costumers to sign and return. (CPG Letter f 4.) 
On or about September 25, 2002, Westgate filed for a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction to prevent CPG from sending more letters to Westgate costumers until the 
conclusion of a trial on the merits. The parties stipulated to a temporary restraining order on or 
about September 30, 2002, and CPG filed a counterclaim against Westgate, alleging, among other 
things, that: (1) certain Westgate behavior was in violation of the UCSPA, and CPG as assignee 
of some 900 Westgate costumers, is entitled to relief in the amount of $2000 for each of those 
claims or such greater amounts as may be proven at trial, plus reasonable attorneys' fees as 
allowed under the UCSPA; and (2) that CPG as assignee is entitled to relief under the common 
law tort of fraud in the amount of damages suffered by the assignors as a result of Westgate's 
allegedly fraudulent practices. These claims represent the fifth and sixth causes of action 
respectively as set forth in the defendant's counterclaim. 
On or about November 27,2002, Westgate filed a motion to dismiss counts five and six of 
the counterclaim on the following grounds: (1) defendant does not have standing to pursue those 
claims; (2) defendant is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; and (3) defendant has failed 
to plead allegations of fraud with particularity. On December 12,2002, CPG filed a motion in 
objection to Westgate's motion to dismiss and on January 6, 2003, Westgate filed a reply 
memorandum. On January 15, 2003, the Court heard oral arguments and took the matter under 
advisement before issuing this ruling. 
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L Standing 
Westgate claims that the defendants CPG and Adel lack standing to sue under the UCSPA 
because they are not a consumer of Westgate and the UCSPA specifically limits recovery to 
"consumers". The UCSPA provides in pertinent part: "A consumer who suffers loss as a result of 
a violation of this chapter may recover, but not in a class action, actual damages or $2,000, 
whichever is greater, plus court costs." Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(2). 
Neither Adel nor CPG claim to be "consumers" for purposes of the UCSPA; however, 
they argue that the UCSPA does not prohibit assignment of USCPA claims and a valid assignment 
confers standing to sue in the place of the assignor. ((CPG Motion in Objection to Dismissal at 7, 
citing Brandenburger & Davis, Inc. v. Estate of Lewis. 771 A.2d 984, 998 (D.C. 2001)). CPG 
further argues that the rule of assignments applies to statutes that explicitly limit the parties who 
may sue. ((CPG Motion in Objection to Dismissal at 7, citing Miami Children's Hosp.. Inc. v. 
MalakofE 795 F. Supp. 718 (S.D. Fla. 1991)(granting a hospital standing to sue for a patient who 
had assigned to the hospital claims against a healthcare provider)). CPG also sites Msic v. 
Building Services Employees Health and Welfare Trust 789 F.2d 1374, 1378 (9* Cir. 1986), 
where "the court went on to demonstrate that an assignee has standing even when the claim arises 
from a statute that 'explicitly limits the parties who may sue/" (CPGMotion in Objection to 
Dismissal at 8). 
While this Court notes that the above sited cases are not controlling, it also finds that their 
holdings are limited to special circumstances not present in this case. In Msic, the assignee had a 
special relationship with the assignors. The assignee was a dentist who provided medical care to 
the assignors. The dentist billed the assignors' health provider who failed to pay the full amount of 
the claims as required by contract. Misiq 789 F2d at 1376. The court held that the dentist should 
have standing to sue as the assignee of his patient because doing so would protect the patient and 
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avoid the necessity of the patient to pay potentially large medical bills and await compensation 
from the plan. Id. at 1377. Without such a relationship, courts have been reluctant to confer 
standing on third party assignees with respect to statutory claims. 
Recently, in Simon v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Health Care Plan. No. 00-1331, 2002 U.S. 
App LEXIS at **5 (10th Cir. June 11, 2001), the court denied standing to an assignee of a 
statutory claim explaining that "[b]ecause plaintiff does not qualify as a party entitled to ERISA 
civil enforcement provisions, he does not have standing to bring this action." Referencing Misiq 
the court in Simon v. Value Behavioral Health. Inc.. 955 F.Supp. 93, 95 (CD. 1997), refused to 
grant an assignee standing, explaining that the "[p]laintiff fails to present persuasive authority 
supporting standing of a third party ERISA claim assignee other than the beneficiary's health care 
provider." Id. at 95. Likewise, in the instant case, CPG has failed to present persuasive authority 
that would support standing of a third party UCSPA assignee who is not a consumer. The case 
law provided by CPG concern statutes that either expressly authorize assignment of claims or 
involve a special relationship, namely, the physician-patient relationship; both absent in this case. 
Considering the language of the UCSPA, and its apparent purpose and intent, this Court 
finds that the defendants lack standing to sue under the Act. The defendants, seeking to take 
advantage of the statutory remedies available under the UCSPA, must strictly comply with all the 
requirements of the Act. Without the specific statutory claim provided in 13-11-1 in sequence, the 
defendants would not have the opportunity of alleging the claim set forth in the fifth cause of 
action. The right of relief is created by statute and is intended to be restricted to a particular class 
of people who qualify under the statute The relief sought here is not a common law relief but a 
specific statutory remedy and the defendants do not qualify under the specific class requirement of 
the Act 
Because the defendant is not a consumer, Westgate is entitled to relief on the standing 
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issue with respect to the UCSPA claim. The fact that the defendants have received assignments 
from those who may have been consumers does not qualify them as a consumer under the Act. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs motion as to standing is granted. 
BE. Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Westgate also argues that the fifth and sixth causes of action set forth in the defendant's 
counterclaim should be dismissed because the defendants engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law. ((Westgate Motion to Dismiss at 11, citing Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634 (Utah 1944)). 
Nelson involved a collection agency who solicited from the general public various claims for the 
payment of money for collection. The agency would bring suit if necessary, pay all court costs, 
and furnish all legal services in return for a fixed percentage of any sum recovered. 154 P.2d 635. 
The defendants filed lawsuits "in their own names as assignees of the real owner of the claims." 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that such activities constitute the unauthorized practice of law, 
stating, "[t]he authorities almost uniformly hold that laymen cannot evade and circumvent a 
statute such as [the unauthorized practice of law statute] by the device of taking an assignment of 
the claim and proceeding in their own names." Id. at 639. 
The instant case is similar in all respects to the Nelson case. CPG was formed to solicit 
legal claims from Westgate costumers, and has agreed to file suit in its own name and to finance 
and direct the litigation in return for a portion of the recovery. Indeed, the language in Nelson 
could hardly be more applicable to this case. "The question as to whether the defendants are 
illegally engaging in the practice of law by soliciting the placements of claims in their hands for 
collection, having an assignment of the claim made to them, and then proceeding in their own 
names as assignees to prepare legal papers, institute law suits, manage and conduct supplemental 
proceedings, employ counsel, etc., really presents two problems: First, can they proceed in their 
own names as assignees to do the work themselves; and second, can they institute, manage and 
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control proceedings and preparation of legal papers by employing a licensed attorney to do the 
work for them? We believe that both of these questions must be answered in the negative." Id. 
In addition to CPG's business objective and solicitation of legal claims stated above, the 
letter sent out by CPG raises additional concerns. In Utah State Bar v. Petersoa 937 P.2d 1263, 
1268 (Utah 1997) our supreme court offered the following guidance with respect to the practice 
of law: "The practice of law, although difficult to define precisely, is generally acknowledged to 
involve the rendering of services that require the knowledge and application of legal principles to 
serve the interests of another with his consent. It not only consists of performing services in the 
courts of justice throughout the various stages of a matter, but in a larger sense involves 
counseling, advising, and assisting others in connection with their legal rights, duties, and 
liabilities. It also includes the preparation of contracts and other legal instruments by which legal 
rights and duties are fixed." Peterson. 937 P.2d at 1228. 
Statements in CPG's letter such as "[practices such as those described above are unlawful 
under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act", and "you may be able to recover your damages or 
$2,000.00 whichever is greater", involve counseling, advising, and assisting others in connection 
with their legal rights. Although CPG does not explicitly claim competence to render legal advice 
or to take legal action, such competence may be implied by the letter's legal conclusions as well as 
the scale of justice logo and enclosure of a pre-prepared affidavit and assignment form. 
After carefully reviewing the CPG letter and comparing the facts of this case with Nelson, 
it appears clear that the defendant CPG has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law as the 
Plaintiff contends. However, the statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law in Utah does 
not provide for a private right of action. The statute states: "the prohibition against the practice of 
law in Subsection (1) shall be enforced by any civil action or proceedings instituted by the Board 
of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar." U.C.A. § 78-9-101(2). The plaintiff has failed to 
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present persuasive authority supporting standing of a party other than the state bar to assert a 
claim under the statute. Hence, while this Court is troubled by the unauthorized practice of law 
apparent in this case, it leaves the matter for the Utah State Bar to bring the appropriate action 
under 78-9-101. 
IIL Failure to Plead Fraud with Particularity 
Finally, Westgate asserts that the claims of fraud as set forth in the counterclaim should be 
dismissed for failing to comply with Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(b) 
states that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity." After reviewing the counterclaim in its entirety, this Court finds 
that it satisfies the requirements of Rule 9. The detailed descriptions of the alleged fraudulent 
practices performed by Westgate contmned in counts 68 through 72 of defendant's counterclaim 
give the plaintiff ample information to mount its defense and are sufficiently particular to satisfy 
Rule 9. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court grants the plaintiffs motion to dismiss with respect to 
the fifth cause of action and denies the plaintiffs motion to dismiss with respect to the 
sixth cause of action Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an order consistent with this 
ruling and submit it for signature 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTGATE RESORTS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAUN S. ADEL, et al., 
Defendants. 
LTD., CASE NUMBER: 020404068 
DATED: AUGUST 31,2005 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on Westgate Resorts, Inc.'s ("Westgate") 
motion to dismiss Counts V, VI, VII, and VIII of defendants' amended counterclaim, 
brought by Consumer Protection Group, LLC (CPG) as assignee of approximately 950 
consumers who had prior business contacts with Westgate. Having carefully considered 
the motion, memoranda supporting and opposing the motion and the prior rulings of the 
court, I now issue this ruling denying Westgate's motion except as to Count V. 
I. Procedural History. 
Defendants' current amended counterclaim replaces a series of former 
counterclaims, the first of which was filed on October 23, 2002 ("Original 
Counterclaim"). Former Count V of the Original Counterclaim sought relief under the 
Utah Consumer Sales Protection Act ("UCSPA") and former Count VI alleged common 
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law fraud. Westgate moved to dismiss former Counts V and VI of the Original 
Counterclaim. On February 20, 2003, Westgate's motion was granted as to Count V 
(UCSPA) claim and denied as to Count VI (fraud). 
Thereafter, defendants sought leave to amend the Original Counterclaim to 
replace the UCSPA claim with a claim under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act 
("UPUAA"). Then defendants sought leave to amend their counterclaim a second time, 
seeking to join 950 aggrieved consumers as parties and to add a claim for relief based on 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On October 4, 2004, the 
parties stipulated to allow defendants to add the breach of covenant claim, but the court 
denied leave to amend to join the 950 consumers. 
The amended counterclaim at issue in this motion (the "Amended Counterclaim") 
was filed on March 3, 2005. It contains the UPUAA, Fraud, and Breach of Covenant 
claims as counts VI, VII, and VIII respectively. It also recites the UCSPA claim as Count 
V, with the caveat that "[t]his cause of action has been dismissed ... but is included herein 
to preserve counterclaimants' right to appeal." (Amended Counterclaim f 68.) 
On March 31, 2005, Westgate filed this motion to dismiss counts V, VI, VII and 
VIII of the Amended Counterclaim. 
II. Preliminary Consideration: Application of the "law of the case". 
Westgate and CPG each allege that the other is attempting to relitigate claims or 
arguments resolved by the court's order of February 20, 2003, which dismissed one count 
of the Original Counterclaim while retaining the other counts of the Original 
Counterclaim. Westgate correctly points out that the February 20,2003, order is the "law 
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of the case". CPG correctly points out that "[amplication of law of the case should not 
depend on whether a particular ruling was favorable to [one party or the other]." 
The law of the case doctrine is grounded in the principle that a matter once 
decided by a trial court in a case is binding on the parties through all of the subsequent 
stages of the same case. It is a doctrine both of judicial economy - matters once having 
been considered by the court will not be reconsidered absent unusual circumstances - and 
economy for the parties - they will not need to expend their resources to ask the court, 
repeatedly, to consider a matter as to which the court previously has spoken. 
Under Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Ut App. 1994), 
there are limited circumstances under which a trial court properly should reconsider a 
prior decision, and this bypass the law of the case doctrine.1 With that checklist as a 
guide, in this case I only will reconsider claims or arguments that have already been 
adjudicated if the parties clearly fit within one of the grounds for reconsideration set forth 
in Trembly or otherwise can demonstrate to the court a sound basis for reconsidering the 
prior decision. 
HI. Count V must be dismissed because applicable law has not changed. 
With only minor grammatical changes, Count V of the Amended Counterclaim is 
virtually identical to the UCSPA claim dismissed on February 20, 2003. Notwithstanding 
1
 "A Court can consider several factors in determining the propriety of reconsidering a 
prior ruling. These may include, but are not limited to, when (1) the matter is presented in a 
'different light' or under 'different circumstances;' (2) there has been a change in the governing 
law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) 'manifest injustice' will result if the court does not 
reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was 
inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the court." 
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CPG's argument that applicable law has changed or been clarified, the case it cites as a 
change in the law, Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 78 P.3d 616 (Ut. App. 
2003), does not even speak to the UCSPA. As such, that case does not constitute a 
"change in the law" that Trembly advances as a reason to reconsider a prior ruling. 
Judge Stott had the benefit of full briefing on the motion to dismiss the UCSPA 
claim and thoroughly considered the requirements of UCSPA that a consumer suffer 
damages in a sales transaction, conditions of the statute that CPG cannot meet.2 He also 
considered the procedure under the UCSPA for class actions and its requirement that the 
class representative be injured by the improper sales practice, something that CPG also 
cannot meet. His decision to dismiss that claim was well-taken. I will not revisit the 
issue since the only case cited by CPG as being a change in the law does not even concern 
the UCSPA. Count V must be dismissed. 
IV, Count VI may stand because UPUAA claims may be assigned, 
Westgate advances two reasons for the dismissal of Count VI. First, it asserts that 
CPG lacks standing to bring the UPUAA claims in behalf of the 950 consumers, and 
second, the joinder of the claims of the 950 consumers is improper. Both reasons are 
similar to arguments rejected in the February 20, 2003 order, but each is sufficiently 
different in substance to be considered. 
2
 Under the UCSPA enforcement actions only may be brought by consumers, by 
consumers on behalf of a class of similarly situated consumers or by the Division of Consumer 
Protection. CPG is none of these. 
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A, CPG has standing to bring validly assigned UPUAA claims. 
Westgate's standing argument presents itself in two alternative forms. First, 
Westgate argues that UPUAA claims are not assignable. Alternatively, Westgate argues 
that CPG, as an assignee of an assigned UPUAA claim, does not have standing to assert 
the claim of its assignors unless CPG has some injury to its business or property; it cannot 
rely upon the injuries to the assignors. I will treat these arguments in inverse order. 
1. Assignees generally have standing to assert assigned claims. 
In general, "an assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered 
by the assignor." Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel Stevens, 
529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (this language is technically dicta, since Vermont Agency does 
not involve assignees, but articulates a well-settled principle). "This is true even though 
the assignment is for the purpose of suit only and the transferee is obligated to account for 
the proceeds of suit to his assignor." Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 289 (1939). 
Westgate argues from a number of federal RICO cases that the party making a RICO 
claim must have been injured in its business or property. Under the analysis of Vermont 
Agency and similar cases, however, the injury which CPG is asserting here is the injury to 
the business or property of its multitude of assignors. Thus, under Vermont Agency, the 
requirement of injury to business or property can be met if the assignors had an injury to 
business or property. 
2. No provision of law prohibits assignment of UPUAA claims. 
Westgate does not point to any provision of law that would prohibit assignees 
from asserting UPUAA claims, nor is the court independently aware of any such 
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provision. Westgate and CPG agree to look by analogy to federal RICO case law, since 
the UPUAA, formerly known as the Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Enterprises Act, 
was "patterned after the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act" 
(RICO). State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rev 'd on other grounds. 
Contrary to Westgate's theory that RICO claims are assignable only under very 
restrictive conditions, ,f[l]ower federal courts which have addressed the issue of the 
assignability of RICO claims have universally held that RICO claims are assignable." 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. S & K Chevrolet, 868 F. Supp. 1047, 1054 (CD. 111. 1994). 
None of the four cases on which Westgate relies supports Westgate's position, but rather 
in each the assignee had standing to proceed with the RICO case without any requirement 
of separate injury or other special circumstances creating standing. See Paolini v. 
Goldstein, 200 F.R.D. 644, 645 (D. Colo. 2001) ("Plaintiff-Brokers are assignees . . . [a]s 
such the Plaintiff-Brokers have standing to prosecute these claims against Defendants"), 
Federal Insurance Company v. Parello, 767 F. Supp. 157, 163 (N.D. 111. 1991) ("The 
assignability of RICO claims is not a question of first impression. . . . RICO claims are 
assignable"), Federal Insurance Company v. Ayers, 760 F. Supp. 1118, 1120 (E.D. Pa. 
1990) ("RICO claims (including claims for treble damages) are assignable"), In re 
National Mortgage Equity Corp., 636 F. Supp. 1138, 1152-56 (CD. Cal. 1986) 
(comparing to anti-trust claims, "RICO treble damage claims likewise should be 
assignable"). 
Giving weight to the clear statements from a multiplicity of federal courts 
concerning the assignability of federal RICO claims and the ability of assignees to sue on 
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such claims as a basis for evaluating the UPUAA case at issue here, I conclude that CPG 
has the right, as assignee of the 950 consumers, to sue on the claimed violations of 
UPUAA. 
B. CPG's joinder is a permissible under the law cited by the parties. 
Westgate's only remaining theories on which it asks the court to dismiss CPG's 
UPUAA claims is that the joinder of 950 consumer claims is improper. First, Westgate 
claims that this court should dismiss CPG's claims unless CPG characterizes them as a 
class action. This argument was raised, considered, and rejected in the February 20, 2003 
ruling and I will not revisit that claim. Westgate's second argument, that joinder is 
improper under URCP 20, was not raised before. I will consider it now. 
1. The court is faced with a choice between one suit and 950 suits. 
As CPG is quick to point out, Westgate is unclear about what it wants the court to 
do with CPG's 950 claims. As a practical matter, since CPG is presumably the owner of 
950 validly assigned claims, the court is faced with two options: (1) reject Westgate's 
argument and allow CPG to bring the claims in one lawsuit; or (2) accept Westgate's 
argument and force CPG to bring the claims in 950 separate lawsuits. No doubt if CPG 
brings 950 suits someone would seek to consolidate the cases either for discovery 
purposes or for trial. 
2. CPG's joinder of assigned claims is permissible. 
The rules of civil procedure draw a distinction between joinder of claims and 
joinder of parties. The rules for joinder of claims are fairly relaxed, allowing a defendant 
in a counterclaim to "join as many claims . . . as he may have against an opposing party." 
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URCP 18(a). If this is a circumstance where CPG, as the counterclaimant, seeks to join 
the claims of its 950 assignors, arguably it is an assignment of claims which should be 
permitted under Rule 18(a). 
Parties, on the other hand, may be joined only in more restrictive circumstances. 
URCP 20(a) requires that joined parties be either (1) subject to joint and several liability, 
or (2) linked by "the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences." 
In this case it is not altogether clear whether this is a case of joinder of claims or 
of joinder of parties.3 But it may not matter. 
Here CPG alleges Westgate was involved in a systematic, ongoing pattern of 
fraudulent activity that affected many, many individuals. In sharp contrast to the 
unrelated creditor claims gathered up by the plaintiff in Stank, what occurred here is a 
"series of transactions" as contemplated by URCP 20(a). 
3
 The Utah Supreme Court considered whether a joinder was of claims or of parties in 
Stank v. Jones, 404 P.2d 964, 965 (Utah 1965). There a collections agency acquired "twelve 
different, distinct, and unrelated claims" from seven assignors and asserted them against a 
debtor defendant in a single lawsuit. The court concluded that "[o]bviously, the seven 
assignors could not have joined as plaintiffs and asserted their diverse and unrelated claims in 
one action against the defendant. Why, then, should they be allowed to do indirectly what they 
could not do directly? The answer is they should not." 
In his typical, inimitable fashion, Justice Henriod, concurring in Stank, further clarified 
the practical necessity of the Court's ruling in a hypothetical, where a single assignee gathers 
the claims of various plaintiffs: "for assault and battery, liability on a promissory note, 
reformation of a deed, cancellation of an instrument for fraud, alienation of affections, invasion 
of the right of privacy, violation of an agency agreement, claim for wrongful death, damages for 
negligent collision, violation of a patent right, a claim for water damage, invasions of the rights 
of a beleaguered husband's wife, selling adulterated food, kicking the neighbor's trespassing 
kid off his property, and even quo warranto ouster proceedings-all before one bewildered 
jury,-and all for a $17 filling fee." He concluded that "Rule 18(a) never was intended to 
produce such ridiculosity " 404 P.2d at 966. 
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Westgate argues that CPG's assigned claims do not "arise out of the same . . . 
series of transactions" by pointing out that CPG's affidavit form contains fill-in-the-blank 
and check-box provisions that individualize the consumer claims. These provisions allow 
the consumers to describe (1) the manner of Westgate's solicitation of the individual 
consumer's business, (2) the precise statements, omissions and promises of Westgate 
representatives, and (3) the manner in which Westgate representatives allegedly exerted 
pressure. Contrary to Westgate's claim, however, where, as here, CPG is pursuing 
joinder governed by URCP 20, joinder is proper if the injuries "arise out of the same . . . 
series of transactions." Under this standard, the fact that CPG is able to classify its claims 
using fill-in-the-blank and check-box provisions only bolsters CPG's position. 
CPG's allegations in the Amended Counterclaim are sufficiently detailed to allow 
the court to conclude that the events as alleged appear to "arise out of the same . . . series 
of transactions." For the purposes of the motion to dismiss I must accept these facts as 
alleged. Based thereon it is clear CPG is asserting a series of injuries to a long list of 
assignors all of which arose out of a single series of transactions. 
Thus, whether the joinder is deemed a joinder of claims under Rule 18(a) or a 
joinder of parties under Rule 20(a), joinder of these claims is appropriate. 
3. The number of claims is not an obstacle to joinder. 
The authority cited by the parties does not clearly address the issue of whether the 
number of claims can be an obstacle to joinder, but the cases the parties cite make it 
sufficiently clear that assertions of large numbers of claims by assignees is not 
unprecedented. In in re National Mortgage Equity Corporation, plaintiff brought RICO 
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claims assigned from "nineteen investor institutions" alleging fraud. 636 F. Supp. 1118, 
1143 (CD. Cal. 1986). In Paolini v. Goldstein, plaintiffs were allowed to assert RICO 
claims in behalf of "more than half of the 508 customers." 200 F.R.D. 644, 646 n. 4 (D. 
Colo. 2001). In APCC Servs. v. Sprint Communs. Co., plaintiffs were allowed to 
aggregate "more than 1400" claims for failure to pay dial-around compensation under the 
federal Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 12759 (D.C. Cir. 2005). I see no legal impediment to joinder in this case of the 
claims which CPG raises against Westgate, even though a very large number of claims is 
involved. 
4, Judicial economy and substantial justice favor one suit over 950. 
Finally, the court has discretion under URCP 20(b) to "order separate trials or 
make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice" to the parties. Here, without doubt a 
single, massive trial including 950 consumer claims will be costly, time-consuming, and a 
logistical nightmare. But, it seems to me, separating the matter into 950 individual trials 
only will exacerbate the delay and expense to the parties and increase the administrative 
burden to the court.4 
4
 Westgate claims that a lawsuit involving the claims of 950 consumers, each of whom 
may be required to testify, will be extremely time-consuming, although Westgate's figure of a 
half-day per witness seems significantly exaggerated. I cannot conceive, however, that such a 
trial likely will be more time-consuming and an administrative headache than 950 separate 
trials, including selecting and instructing 950 separate juries, 950 separate opening statements 
and closing arguments, 950 separate plans for discovery, and 950 separate pre-trial hearings, 
motion hearings, rulings and orders, all asserted by CPG as assignee against Westgate, all 
involving highly similar facts and claiming essentially the same injury. Indeed, could there be a 
better argument for consolidation? 
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In summary, in the interest of judicial economy and substantial justice, and 
finding that joinder of so many claims is not inappropriate, I deny Westgate's motion to 
dismiss Count VI of the Amended Counterclaim. 
V, Count VII may stand as the adequacy of the fraud allegations previously has 
been decided by the court. 
Count VII of the Amended Counterclaim is virtually identical to former Count VI 
of the Original Counterclaim. Westgate's original motion to dismiss that earlier claim 
was denied. Other than the improper joinder claim discussed above, which Westgate 
asserts should invalidate all of the claims of the Amended Counterclaim, Westgate's only 
substantive argument against this claim is that defendants did not plead the fraud 
allegations with particularity. Yet the allegations of this claim are substantially the same 
as the allegations of the prior claim which the court previously found adequate under 
Rule 9. I see no flaw in that prior conclusion and deny the motion to dismiss this claim. 
VI. Count VIII may stand as the claim is pled with sufficient particularity. 
Westgate advances two theories in support of its motion to dismiss Count VIII: 
improper joinder and failure to plead allegations of fraud with particularity. Having 
considered and rejected the improper joinder claim, I only will review the claim under 
Rule 9 of a failure to plead the allegations of Count VIII with particularity. 
In this matter Westgate only touches briefly on its claim of failure to plead with 
particularity with respect to Count VIII. That passing discussion is inadequate to assist 
the court in determining the adequacy of the pleadings of Count VIII. As well, while the 
pleading is more spare than it could be, the allegations of misrepresentation resulting in a 
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breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are sufficient. I deny the motion to 
dismiss Count VIII. 
VII. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing and on the February 20, 2003 order, Westgate's motion to 
dismiss is granted as to Count V and denied as to Counts VI, VII, and VIII. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants' counsel is 
directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this j[j_ day of August, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
ANTHONY JV. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 ( 1 0 : 0 2 a . m . ) 
3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument 
4 first this morning in Case 07-1216, Philip Morris v. 
5 Williams. 
6 Mr. Shapiro. 
7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO 
8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 
9 MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, 
10 and may it please the Court: 
11 We are here today because the Oregon court 
12 failed to follow this Court's directions on remand and 
13 because the ground it gave is not adequate to show a 
14 forfeiture of due process rights, 
15 This — this Court vacated after finding 
16 that the Oregon Supreme Court applied the wrong 
17 constitutional standard, and it remanded with directions 
18 to apply the standard that the Court laid out. But the 
19 Oregon court didn't do that. It never even addressed 
20 the constitutional issue. The Oregon court, of course, 
21 refused to follow this Court's direction because it 
22 believed there were mistakes in another paragraph in our 
23 instruction request dealing with what the court referred 
24 to as "unrelated issues." 
25 But that isn't what this Court mandated. 
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1 And the specific forfeiture theory adopted here for the 
2 first time after nine years of appellate litigation is 
3 completely inadequate to avoid this mandate. 
4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Shapiro, we are 
5 dealing with a State supreme court, and our bottom line 
6 always reads "for further proceedings not inconsistent 
7 with this opinion." And it was my understanding that a 
8 State court can resolve a case on an alternate State law 
9 ground, if there is such a ground in the case. 
10 MR. SHAPIRO: Yes, Your Honor. We believe 
11 that this disposition is quite inconsistent with what 
12 the Court mandated. The Court heard arguments in this 
13 case about the "correct in all respects" rule, but it 
14 still mandated an application of the constitutional 
15 standard, including the prohibition on punishment for 
16 harm to non-parties, and that standard simply was never 
17 applied. We say that is inconsistent with this Court's 
18' opinion. 
19 JUSTICE SOUTER: But it seems to me the 
20 problem with the argument is that to say it is 
21 inconsistent with the opinion we implicitly have to say 
22 that the Oregon Supreme Court has to confront State law 
23 issues in a certain sequence, and that if it does not do 
24 so those issues are waived, as it were, not only by the 
25 court but by the party who raised it. And the 
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1 difficulty, I think, with your position here is that on 
2 the assumption, which I do make, that the — that the 
3 issue, "correct in all respect" issue, was properly 
4 raised by the other side, if we accept your position, we 
5 in effect are saying the other side is not going to have 
6 an opportunity to argue that before the Oregon Supreme 
7 Court, And thatfs, it seems to me, kind of a steep hill 
8 for you to climb. 
9 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, we don't say that the 
10 court can never adopt a State law standard after remand 
11 from this Court, but we say that this disposition is 
12 inconsistent — 
13 JUSTICE SOUTER: I know you are saying that 
14 but why — why does the disposition that you are asking 
15 for not entail what I just said, and that is, in effect 
16 you cut off the claim by a party raised before the 
17 Oregon Supreme Court, not considered by the Oregon 
18 Supreme Court, and you cut off that claim simply because 
19 the Oregon Supreme Court chose to approach the issues in 
20 the case in a certain sequence? What business do we 
21 have to do that? 
22 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, because the preservation 
23 issue was debated before this Court and it adopted a 
24 specific order here saying on remand now consider the 
25 constitutional standard, which is the prohibition on — 
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1 JUSTICE SOUTER: I know the language that 
2 you are referring to. 
3 MR. SHAPIRO: Yes. 
4 JUSTICE SOUTER: But the referring to that 
5 language simply skips over the issue that I am trying to 
6 raise. Isn't there a problem that we should be 
7 concerned with if we accept your position in cutting off 
8 the claim made by one party to the case which was never 
9 heard by the Oregon Supreme Court? 
10 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, Your Honor, this is very 
11 similar to what occurred in the Sullivan case in this 
12 Court, where the issue of preservation was debated 
13 before this Court at the cert stage in the cert papers, 
14 and the Court said: We sub silentio passed on the 
15 adequacy of the State ground when we CDRed the case. 
16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Didn't — did the 
17 Court -- suppose the — what is it called -- "correct in 
18 all respects" had been raised and decided by the Oregon 
19 Supreme Court in the first instance. Suppose it had 
20 said, well, we don't have to deal with whether 
21 Instruction 34 was right or wrong in this particular, 
22 because it was wrong in other respects. Suppose that 
23 had been the first time around what the Oregon Supreme 
24 Court said. Would that have offended any Federal due 
25 process? Would that have been an appropriate 
6 
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1 disposition for the Oregon Supreme Court to make? 
2 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, that takes us to our 
3 second and principal argument, which is that that ground 
4 would not be adequate under this Court's criteria for 
5 adequacy. And we say that there are really three 
6 reasons why that would not be an adequate ground for 
7 forfeiting this constitutional right. It's an ambush. 
8 It was a surprise ruling that we couldn't anticipate. 
9 It is an exercise in futility because, even if we 
10 submitted a perfect instruction that complied with that 
11 rule, we would have been rejected anyway by the trial 
12 court that simply believed that this instruction wasn't 
13 required by the — 
14 JUSTICE SOUTER: Isn't the place to make 
15 that argument in the Oregon Supreme Court? 
16 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, no. The Oregon Supreme 
17 
18 JUSTICE SOUTER: Wouldn't it have been 
19 appropriate to -- to hear the — the issue that they are 
20 raising and for you to make the reply that you have just 
21 made? 
22 MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, this Court has 
23 said repeatedly that adequacy is a Federal law question 
24 for this Court to decide. 
25 JUSTICE SOUTER: I realize it's a Federal 
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1 law question and in approaching that question, I keep 
2 asking the question which I think I have now put to you 
3 three times and have yet to hear an answer on the merits 
4 on: Why is it appropriate for us to have a rule here 
5 that cuts off the right of a party that properly raised 
6 an issue in the Oregon Supreme Court and has yet to be 
7 heard on the merits in the Oregon Supreme Court? 
8 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, there are two reasons. 
9 First under the adequacy decisions of this Court, 
10 including Lee v. Kemna, if it takes years and years 
11 after the trial to articulate a forfeiture rule like 
12 this that counts heavily against the adequacy of the 
13 State ground. This Court held that in Lee v. Kemna very 
14 recently. 
15 And then secondly, this is a point that was 
16 argued to this Court four separate times now and when 
17 the Court remanded with explicit directions to apply the 
18 constitutional standard that's something that had to be 
19 done on remand. The Court did not invite the lower 
20 court to get into the question of whether this request 
21 was made. The Court found that the request was made. 
22 JUSTICE SOUTER: Maybe — maybe this Court 
23 insufficiently appreciated the significance of the issue 
24 which is now before us. And I still want to know, is 
25 there a good reason on the merits why it is fair for us 
8 
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1 to cut off the right of the other side to raise an issue 
2 that they raise or to argue an issue that they raised in 
3 a timely fashion? 
4 MR. SHAPIRO: Yes, there is a good reason, 
5 because this is -- adequacy is ultimately a Federal 
6 question for this Court to decide. The issue was 
7 debated here four separate times at great length. The 
8 Court remanded for a specific decision by the lower 
9 court. That wasn't done. And if we turn to the 
10 adequacy doctrine — 
11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. What — what 
12 issue was debated here four times? 
13 MR. SHAPIRO: Whether or not there was an 
14 adequate State ground because of the "correct in all 
15 respects" rule. That was debated in the merits brief, 
16 in the cert oppositions twice. It was debated again in 
17 the cert opposition this time around. But the Court has 
18 never accepted it. 
19 JUSTICE STEVENS: But the State court hadn't 
20 ruled on it at that time. 
21 MR. SHAPIRO: That's correct. 
22 JUSTICE STEVENS: So how do we rule on it as 
23 a matter of first impression? 
24 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, because, Your Honor, the 
25 Court considered, just as it did in Sullivan, it 
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1 considered these issues in the cert papers and then 
2 remanded the case for a different issue to be decided by 
3 the lower court. 
4 But we don't hesitate from debating the 
5 adequacy issue. 
6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Did our opinion decide that 
7 — that question? Did our opinion say that that 
8 question was decided against your opponent? 
9 MR. SHAPIRO: No. What the Court said in 
10 Sullivan was that it was a sub silentio determination. 
11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How could we have 
12 determined it when the Oregon Supreme Court itself 
13 hadn't made any determination? 
14 MR. SHAPIRO: Because the parties debated 
15 this extensively in their briefs. 
16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But we don't decide 
17 questions, particularly questions of State law, that may 
18 have a Federal check. But we don't decide them in the 
19 first instance. 
20 And there's one point, Mr. Shapiro, that I 
21 think affects this concern of fairness to the parties 
22 who raised this "correct in all respects" from the 
23 beginning. This Court had not clarified, had it, until 
24 the Williams case itself, the rule about harm to others. 
25 In State Farm we were talking about harm to 
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1 nonresidents. So if I recall correctly, Williams was 
2 the first time we ever clarified that harm to others 
3 included people within the same State; is that correct? 
4 MR. SHAPIRO: Yes. That's true. 
5 This -- this, as the Court expressed it, was 
6 a slight extension of the previous decisions. But Your 
7 Honor, if the Court feel that this adequacy issue hasn't 
8 been dealt with previously by this Court, it's presented 
9 squarely here. It is a Federal question, which this 
10 Court says has to be decided by this Court. And we 
11 don't hesitate from — 
12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suppose one reason 
13 — one reason to think it may not have been decided is 
14 that, unlike the other situations you have discussed, it 
15 would not have been a bar to our consideration of this 
16 case the last time because, just as you raise the 
17 question in your second question presented that whether 
18 the award complies with due process, we may have thought 
19 there might have been an adequate and independent State 
20 ground on a procedural question, but we were going to go 
21 ahead. We granted cert on the substantive question on 
22 whether the damages award was unconstitutional. 
23 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, Your Honor, if — if 
24 we're not right about the decision resolving the 
25 adequacy issue already, we're happy to turn to it now 
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1 and address it as we do in our briefs. This is not an 
2 adequate State ground under this Court's decisions. The 
3 first reason for that is that this is a futile gesture 
4 that the State court requires of us. 
5 JUSTICE STEVENS: I want to ask you about 
6 that. That's the thrust of your argument: It would 
7 have been futile to comply with the specific, drafting a 
8 perfect — perfect instruction "correct in all 
9 respects." But I have to think the trial -- the record 
10 is subject to the reading that the trial judge thought 
11 the issue had already been adequately taken care of, 
12 rather than it would be an incorrect instruction. 
13 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, the trial judge asked, 
14 is there any authority that requires me to give this 
15 instruction on harm to non-parties? And we said, in our 
16 view it's the BMW case. And she said, well, if there is 
17 not an authority right on point Ifm not going to give 
18 this instruction. She said that very clearly. So if we 
19 submitted a separate piece of paper, it would have made 
20 no difference; and if we had taken out the two mistakes 
21 
22 JUSTICE STEVENS: Where in the record is the 
23 portion of the colloquy about the instructions most 
24 clearly stated in your view, on your side of that issue? 
25 MR. SHAPIRO: Let's see. It's the 
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1 instruction conference. This begins on page 17a, where 
2 Mr. Beaty starts discussing the second prong of this 
3 paragraph. He says — he quotes the language, and the 
4 judge -- the judge says: "Well, I think that that's 
5 covered by giving an instruction that punitive damages 
6 are not compensatory." And he says: No, no, that is 
7 not — "That is not the point of this instruction." 
8 This is pages 17 and 18a. 
9 JUSTICE STEVENS: But that's exactly the 
10 point I make. I think the trial judge was saying, I 
11 think it's already covered, which is different from 
12 saying, no matter how you phrase it, I won't give it. 
13 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, she said she just 
14 disagreed with the idea that there should be protection 
15 against punishment for harm to non-parties. And she 
16 said unless there's a case requiring that, I'm not going 
17 to give that instruction. And she said — 
18 JUSTICE SOUTER: Didn't she also say that 
19 she was going to give, and ultimately did give an 
20 instruction, to the effect that punitive damages are 
21 punitive, they are not for the compensation of this 
22 person or any other person, and to — she then turned to 
23 Philip Morris's counsel and said: What about that? And 
24 Philip Morris's counsel said okay. 
25 MR. SHAPIRO: What he was saying when he 
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1 said okay was: I understand your ruling and I'm not 
2 going to continue to argue a point that Ifve already 
3 lost. But he pressed that point — 
4 JUSTICE SOUTER: It doesn't sound like much 
5 of an objection. 
6 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, the — the State courts 
7 both held -- both of the appellate courts held our 
8 instruction was rejected. And this Court said it was 
9 rejected, too, in its opinion. And that's exactly 
10 right. You can't antagonize the trial judge by arguing 
11 and arguing after your position has been rejected. 
12 JUSTICE BREYER: But — but the — the 
13 problem that I am having at the moment is that they did 
14 -- from your point of view, is that they -- the other 
15 side listed 28 cases in which they said the Oregon 
16 courts have followed this rule that the instruction has 
17 to be good as a whole. 
18 Now, I have looked up those 28 cases, and 
19 they do — they do say that. They do say it, or they 
20 imply it, or they apply it. They are not completely on 
21 point, but they are not completely out of point, either. 
22 And — and so I suppose what happened is that the judge 
23 there just looked at this instruction on 32(a). It 
24 looks like sort of it's all together. It really does 
25 look like it's all together, the (1) and the (2). And 
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1 he ran his eye down the page and he said, well, here are 
2 two other ways in which it's no good, and so that's the 
3 end of it. You can't raise your objection. Maybe you 
4 should have had four instructions instead of one, but 
5 you did just have one. 
6 And under Oregon law, unless every part of 
7 it is right, the judge is correct m not giving it, even 
8 if he never mentions the other part. And that 28 — it 
9 does seem as if that's what those 28 cases do say. So 
10 what do we say about that? 
11 MR. SHAPIRO: The — the reason we say that 
12 those 28 cases did not give us reasonable notice that we 
13 had to submit a separate piece of paper or change 
14 another paragraph in the instruction request is that 
15 none of them dealt with a situation where you have 
16 separately numbered requests — 
17 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I mean — please, I 
18 — I don't want to appear skeptical, but I am. And — 
19 and that's because I have looked up in some of those 
20 cases, and then I sort of looked at the — which doesn't 
21 — most of them don't give you the instructions, so it's 
22 a little hard to say. But then I looked on page 32(a) 
23 of this appendix and looked at what your instructions 
24 looked like. 
25 And — and if I were sitting there as a 
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1 judge, I would think, well, gee, that looks like a 
2 single thing there. They have it indented, and they 
3 have a (1) and a (2), and it just looks like itfs one 
4 ball of wax. So can I really fault this Oregon court 
5 for just doing what I said? 
6 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, I — I think so, because 
7 the pattern instruction here told both parties to 
8 include all their paragraphs pertaining to punitive 
9 damages in one numbered instruction, 34. 
10 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, they had some other 
11 handbook that says beware of that. 
12 MR. SHAPIRO: Yes. 
13 JUSTICE BREYER: Because you are going to 
14 run into this rule that says if there is any part of a 
15 single instruction that is wrong, goodbye, even if the 
16 trial judge never mentioned it. 
17 MR. SHAPIRO: But that handbook came out in 
18 2006. And after all, that was a practice tip. It was 
19 not a State court ruling saying you had to organize your 
20 instruction this way. 
21 We had separate paragraphs, separately 
22 numbered. They dealt with different issues. One was 
23 the Constitution and the other was the State statute. 
24 And there's no Oregon case that said that in that 
25 situation you have to break it out into a separate piece 
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1 of pape r . 
2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought the notion was 
3 one issue, one charge. And it wasn't in just one 
4 practice manual. There were a few cited in the brief 
5 that the charge should be limited to one issue, one 
6 point of law. 
7 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, the pattern instructions 
8 told us to put every point pertaining to punitive 
9 damages in Instruction No. 34. Both sides did that. 
10 And the Court was working with plaintiff's instruction, 
11 taking their — 
12 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, it would be pretty 
13 odd. Did the person who wrote that read these 28 cases 
14 or some share thereof? And if you were going to do that 
15 — it wasn't you, I know -- why -- why wouldn't you 
16 just, if you have one instruction, copy the — the model 
17 instruction? Then you won't make errors in the other 
18 parts. 
19 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, you see, the — the 
20 pattern — the pattern instruction didn't include the 
21 due process point. 
22 JUSTICE BREYER: True, but you could add 
23 that to the pattern. 
24 MR. SHAPIRO: That's what we tried to do, 
25 and the — the judge invited us while dealing with the 
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1 other side's instruction to go through this one by one. 
2 She — she was asking us: Now, what's your next 
3 addition? 
4 And we — we got to the due process point, 
5 and she said: What is your authority? And we told her, 
6 and she said: I don't think that instruction is 
7 necessary. 
8 It was separately argued. It was separately 
9 decided by the State courts in the prior decisions, 
10 decided by this Court as -- as a separate matter, and 
11 that is exactly how the trial court approached this. 
12 Her request was to go through this item by item. 
13 She wasn't taking an all-or-nothing approach 
14 to this instruction. She started with plaintiff's 
15 document and asked what from our menu of additions 
16 was necessary. 
17 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm not speaking of this 
18 from the point of view -- I mean I -- when I read that 
19 petition for cert, I thought this is a run- around, and 
20 I'm not sure that I think that now. That is, the reason 
21 is because I put myself in the position of not the trial 
22 judge. The person to put yourself in the position of is 
23 the Oregon Supreme Court justice. And what he is doing 
24 is he's reading that instruction. And — and what can 
25 you say in response to what — what he might have 
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1 thought? 
2 He knows this rule. The rule is if the 
3 instruction is -- is unfavorable in any part, if itfs 
4 wrong, you are out. 
5 MR. SHAPIRO: Well — 
6 JUSTICE BREYER: He knows that rule, because 
7 there have been a lot of cases on it. And then he reads 
8 your instruction, and as I looked carefully — I didn't 
9 know this the first time when it was here, but he said 
10 because it's right in paragraph 1 — I mean it's wrong 
11 in paragraph 1, where he was wrong — I don't have to go 
12 to the rest of it. 
13 MR. SHAPIRO: Yes. 
14 JUSTICE BREYER: Now we send it back, so he 
15 says: Okay, now I've got to go to the rest of it. 
16 MR. SHAPIRO: You know, Justice Breyer, this 
17 is very similar to what was at issue in the Flowers case 
18 which reached this Court. The Alabama Supreme Court had 
19 said if you intermix different appeal points in your 
20 brief, we are not going to consider any of them if there 
21 are any errors to be found in any of the paragraphs in 
22 their brief. 
23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But I thought the whole 
24 thing about — this is the NAACP case you that you were 
25 discussing? 
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1 MR. SHAPIRO: Y e s . 
2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: — that this was 
3 something that the Alabama Supreme Court really sprung 
4 at the last minute, that it was not like this rule. 
5 There were not 2 8 cases in the Alabama Supreme Court 
6 applying the rule. It seemed to be quite a novel rule. 
7 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, what — what the State 
8 argued there was that for 60 years the "correct in all 
9 respects" rule was in effect in Alabama, and they cited 
10 dozens of cases applying it. But this Court unanimously 
11 held that that approach was pointless severity. Even 
12 though the State supreme court there said, we can't 
13 disentangle these arguments, it's too complicated, it's 
14 too much of a burden on the State supreme court, this 
15 Court unanimously found that was pointless severity. 
16 And at that point --
17 JUSTICE STEVENS: There was a basis for 
18 questioning the good faith of the court in that case, I 
19 think. 
20 MR. SHAPIRO: Well — 
21 JUSTICE STEVENS: And I don't think that's 
22 true here. 
23 MR. SHAPIRO: I — I — we don't question 
24 the good faith of the court, but we say that this is 
25 pointless severity, a rule that this Court has applied 
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1 more recently in Lee v. Kemna where there was no issue 
2 of bad faith. The Court thought that it was pointlessly 
3 severe and unnecessarily severe to insist on a perfect 
4 proposal in that case. 
5 JUSTICE BREYER: The best you have come up 
6 with — and I think you have researched this pretty 
7 thoroughly — and the best you have come up with to find 
8 a case where they didn't apply the rule is that George 
9 case, right? "George," I think, is the name of it. 
10 And there, there is an alternative ground 
11 which is that the judge had to — had to give the 
12 instruction himself, and it's a criminal case. And we 
13 Shepardized it and it has only been cited twice. And — 
14 and so I'm slightly at sea, to tell you the truth. And 
15 — and what is the standard I'm supposed to use to 
16 decide whether that State ground is adequate as a matter 
17 of Federal law or not? 
18 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, there is an earlier case 
19 that is interesting, State v. Brown, which comes several 
20 years before, and it's cited in our brief. In that case 
21 an imperfect instructional request was made, and the 
22 Court still found that there was a duty to give the 
23 instruction based on due process. And the reason was 
24 that the parties during the charge conference had 
25 debated the issue. It was a fair-enough exposition for 
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1 the trial court to understand the need for the charge. 
2 And here this really is much like the 
3 Osborne case. You know, in the Osborne case the 
4 defendant didn't make any instructional proposal, and 
5 this Court still reversed and required a new trial with 
6 the correct instruction. It said due process required 
7 that. And the Court said that we -- that the party had 
8 sufficiently brought this to the attention of the trial 
9 judge for Federal adequacy purposes even though no 
10 instruction was -- was proposed. 
11 The lawyer there merely moved to dismiss the 
12 proceeding, never proposed an instruction, but this 
13 Court required a retrial with a correct set of 
14 instructions to the jury. That's an a fortiori case, I 
15 think; and also the Flowers case, I believe, is a 
16 fortiori. There really was a strong and compelling 
17 State interest there in having the lawyers break their 
18 arguments up into separate headings and subheadings so 
19 the appellate court could follow the argument. 
20 But here there wasn't any burden placed on 
21 the trial judge at all by our request. She was going 
22 through these one by one, and she asked us: What's your 
23 next point that you want added? We proposed it. It was 
24 on a silver platter. She didn't have to retype it. She 
25 could have simply read it to* the jury in that form. It 
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1 didn't have to be edited or amended. There literally 
2 was no burden on the trial judge at all. And so we --
3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: She didn't get to the — 
4 the other grounds, because I think it was all about that 
5 paragraph and whether that paragraph was adequate under 
6 our then precedent. And I don't think that — that the 
7 — the incorrect portions of the charge that have now --
8 are now before us were — were even reached then. 
9 MR. SHAPIRO: She did look at the illicit 
10 profits point. And she said: I'm not going to give 
11 that; that's unnecessary. She did — she didn't address 
12 the "may versus shall" issue because she was working 
13 with plaintiffs' proposal. So all — really she just 
14 had before her our request for this due process 
15 instruction. She analyzed it separately, it was debated 
16 before her. 
17 And this is much more specific than what the 
18 lawyers did in the Osborne case. They didn't even 
19 propose an instruction. We served it up on a silver 
20 platter. She could have used it, and indeed there was 
21 no work for the trial judge at all because she was 
22 simply telling the lawyers, make this change, make that 
23 change that we've discussed, so there is zero burden on 
24 the court. 
25 And you have to ask in this situation, what 
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1 is the legitimate State interest that would support this 
2 massive forfeiture of a very important due process 
3 right? The plaintiff says the State interest here is 
4 that it promotes affirmance of jury verdicts whether or 
5 not there has been a due process violation. But think 
6 about that. That's hardly a State interest. 
7 JUSTICE BREYER: The State interest in the 
8 rule in general, I take it, is to require the lawyers, 
9 if they are going to object to the instructions that the 
10 judge is going to give, to produce an instruction that 
11 is a correct instruction of the law. That's — that's 
12 why, I guess, they have this rule. 
13 MR. SHAPIRO: Oh, yes. 
14 JUSTICE BREYER: And — and you'd better get 
15 it right, because if you don't get it right, you're 
16 going to lose your ability to claim that the judge was 
17 wrong in refusing to give any part of it. 
18 Now, if that's the reason they have that 
19 rule, that would seem to apply as much in this case as 
20 in any other case. Why wouldn't it? 
21 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, please recall that in 
22 both Osborne and in the Lee case, there was a general 
23 State purpose of that kind that supported the rule, but 
24 the Court said it was an exorbitant or unnecessarily 
25 severe application of the rule. And that's what we 
24 
Alderson Reporting Company 
Official - Subject to Final Review 
1 contend here, that this is exorbitant, it serves no 
2 legitimate purpose. It is truly a game of gotcha that 
3 just nullifies the defendant's due process rights, 
4 And that precedent I think would be of great 
5 concern in various fields of law. This is a rule of law 
6 that will apply in civil rights cases in the future, 
7 criminal cases, all sorts of cases. 
8 So I — I think if this Court does apply its 
9 own criteria here, it will see that this is an exercise 
10 in futility, it was an ambush as a practical matter. We 
11 didn't have any reason to think we had to submit this 
12 again on a separate piece of paper. 
13 JUSTICE STEVENS: Could you just tell me, 
14 well, why was it an exercise in futility? That's what I 
15 don't quite understand. 
16 MR. SHAPIRO: Oh, because the judge had 
17 ruled as a matter of substantive law that she wasn't 
18 going to give this instruction. It wouldn't matter if 
19 we separated it. 
20 JUSTICE STEVENS: But she said she thought 
21 it was already covered. That's what I — on that very 
22 page you pointed me to. 
23 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, she — she said that was 
24 all she was going to say about the point. And we said, 
25 well, that doesn't cover our point, because we want 
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1 protection against punishment for harm to non-parties. 
2 And she said: I'm not going to give that instruction; I 
3 deny the rest of your request, No. 34. 
4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And where is this 
5 colloquy? I mean, we went through the parts, she said I 
6 think it's covered and it was okay. You seem to be 
7 saying more than ws included in that colloquy. 
8 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, I — I think if — if 
9 you look at the whole colloquy, that's the gist of it. 
10 I -- I have paraphrased it, but --
11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You've made it much 
12 clearer than it was. 
13 MR. SHAPIRO: Perhaps — 
14 (Laughter.) 
15 MR. SHAPIRO: — perhaps I did. But I -- I 
16 would just point out that in Osborne the lawyer didn't 
17 make it clear at all. The lawyer didn't even propose an 
18 instruction. 
19 We proposed a good instruction that this 
20 Court has quoted from emphasizing our language, 
21 saying -- saying it correctly captures the due process 
22 principle. So that is enough to satisfy Federal 
23 criteria of -- of adequacy, and that is sufficient to 
24 preserve the point. There is no dispute that this is 
25 preserved for appellate purposes in Oregon. 
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1 Unless the Court has further questions, I — 
2 I would reserve the balance of our time. 
3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr. 
4 Shapiro. 
5 Mr. Peck. 
6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ROBERT S. PECK 
7 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 
8 MR. PECK: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 
9 please the Court: 
10 This Court's constitutional mandate in this 
11 case is conditioned in several significant respects, and 
12 it invites the discretion and judgment of a State court 
13 that's applying it. First of all, it says that States 
14 have flexibility in coming up with a procedure to 
15 address this procedural due process issue. 
16 It also says that it has to be an 
17 appropriate case; there has to be a significant risk of 
18 juror confusion, and a request. There's no indication 
19 in the opinion that this Court intended to federalize 
20 the State procedure over how that request occurs. 
21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You don't dispute 
22 that it's a Federal question whether that procedure is 
23 adequate and independent? 
24 MR. PECK: I do not, but I also submit that 
25 it is more than adequate. Exist — what the Oregon 
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1 Supreme Court decided was that the existing procedure 
2 permitting a limiting instruction to be requested — in 
3 Oregon it's Rule 105, same language as in the Federal 
4 rule — and such a request has to be timely, it has to 
5 be specific, it has to be on the record. And Oregon 
6 precedent says that when we mean specific, the proponent 
7 has to give us the exact language — this is part of the 
8 party presentation principle — the exact language that 
9 they are asking us to use. 
10 And that means that we also apply our 
11 traditional 92-year-old rule that requests for 
12 instruction must be clear and correct in all respects. 
13 JUSTICE STEVENS: The problem — 
14 JUSTICE BREYER: I would say the 28 cases 
15 are not quite as clear as I suggested. That is, I 
16 couldn't find in those 28 cases really a comparable 
17 situation. 
18 MR. PECK: Well --
19 JUSTICE BREYER: In each instance it seemed 
20 as if one of two things was the case: Either, A, where 
21 the instruction was in error, it really was the matter 
22 brought up in the first place, or the court said, but he 
23 gave the essence of the instruction he wanted anyway. 
24 Now, which of those cases do you think — I 
25 am leading up to, what of -- what of those cases do you 
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1 think is your best support, because I couldn't — they 
2 are not perfect. 
3 MR. PECK: I would look first at 
4 Reyes-Camarena, which is a 2000 — a 2000 decision 
5 involving the death penalty. And there, there were two 
6 parts of this request, in a single request. The request 
7 asked for a mitigating factors instruction, which the 
8 court found was correct on the law and -- and would have 
9 been given had it been asked for separately. 
10 But it also asked the jury to consider 
11 sympathy for the defendant, which they found to be 
12 contrary to Oregon law, and therefore, it was not error 
13 for the trial court to have refused this. 
14 JUSTICE BREYER: What -- what you can't tell 
15 from that is what was the part of the sympathy 
16 instruction that they thought was wrong, and was the 
17 part that they thought was wrong really part and parcel 
18 of the part that the — that the appellant was 
19 complaining about. 
20 MR. PECK: Well, the court, though, did cite 
21 a prior decision that talked about a sympathy 
22 instruction and claimed that this one was no different 
23 than that. It was contained in a single instruction. 
24 It makes clear, the opinion does, on that. 
25 Owings v. Rose is that another case which 
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1 both parties have cited. And in Owings, it's very 
2 clear. There you have two different parts of an 
3 instruction that are offered at the same time, and --
4 and one part is right. And this -- this one deals with 
5 third party liability. 
6 JUSTICE BREYER: But I remember that, 
7 because they said on that one -- some floor covering 
8 thing, wasn't it, that they had some liability for bad 
9 floors or designing the floors wrong — 
10 MR. PECK: If — 
11 JUSTICE BREYER: If that's the case, what 
12 they said was: Don't worry about it because basically 
13 he did give you the instruction that you wanted, though 
14 in a different way --
15 MR. PECK: But — 
16 JUSTICE BREYER: — and besides that, they 
17 added --
18 MR. PECK: And besides that — 
19 JUSTICE BREYER: You're right. 
20 MR. PECK: — this was an alternate ground. 
21 Then in Hotelling v. Walther, a 1944 case, 
22 the proposed instruction consist -- consisted of three 
23 separate sentences, and the Court does reprint that 
24 instruction. And each of those sentences has a 
25 different legal proposition in it. And it was only the 
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1 last sentence, the third proposition, that the Court 
2 found to be in error, and therefore, found that there 
3 was no error in failing to give this instruction because 
4 it was not clear and correct in all respects. 
5 I — I think that that — 
6 JUSTICE BREYER: In the last one, what I 
7 have here is that the court said the so-called requested 
8 instruction was never requested at all — 
9 MR. PECK: But — 
10 JUSTICE BREYER: — at all. 
11 MR. PECK: But I do not believe that that 
12 was the — 
13 JUSTICE BREYER: What is the — what is the 
14 — I will go look at that again. But what is the 
15 standard? I mean, remember, I think what your brother 
16 said at the end is correct. Imagine that yours is a 
17 death case and we have said as a matter of Federal law 
18 that this execution is unconstitutional, and then we 
19 send it back. And the court then says: Oh, we forgot; 
20 there are a couple of matters of State law here that bar 
21 the Federal consideration of the death question. And 
22 here they are. And then they come up with just this. 
23 Is this — is this a situation where you 
24 would be equally — that's my problem. And so, put 
25 yourself in my shoes and — and tell me what you would 
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1 do if this is the death case and not the case that you 
2 have? 
3 MR. PECK: Well, you know, it's — it's hard 
4 to get my arms around your hypothetical, because I don't 
5 know the grounds on which --
6 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm just imagining that 
7 what has happened is that the instruction that they have 
8 given for the defendant in the death case violates 
9 Federal law, and then we send it back, and what happens 
10 is that the State court says, oh, it may violate Federal 
11 law all right, but it's -- the Federal court is blocked 
12 from considering it because there are these two other 
13 State grounds that mean that the lawyer — 
14 MR. PECK: I understand. 
15 • JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. 
16 MR. PECK: But — but the question would be 
17 then, why would that be a situation like this, where the 
18 trial judge — contrary to your assumption, 
19 Justice Ginsburg — the trial judge did find that there 
20 were other parts of the instructions offered by Philip 
21 Morris that were incorrect on the law, and the illicit 
22 profits was one of them. 
23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why didn't the trial judge 
24 just stop there? I mean, if this is the ruling in the 
2 5 S t a t e — 
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1 MR. PECK: Justice — 
2 JUSTICE SCALIA: — once the trial judge 
3 found that one of the other instructions was bad, he 
4 could have just said, I throw the whole thing out. Why 
5 did he go to all the trouble of going into this, the 
6 governing one? 
7 MR. PECK: This is — this is a process. 
8 Counsel in the case in a trial in Oregon can offer 
9 instructions every -- a proffered instruction up to the 
10 point when the jury is instructed under their law. So 
11 Philip Morris had the opportunity to correct it. The 
12 practical nature of a charge conference is that the 
13 parties come in with their proposed instructions. The 
14 plaintiffs followed the pattern instruction, which by 
15 the way does not require enumeration. 
16 JUSTICE SCALIA: You — you are 
17 acknowledging that the trial court did not apply the 
18 rule — 
19 MR. PECK: The — it's not a rule of trial 
20 procedure. It's a rule of appellate review. 
21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I — yes, 
22 that's exactly right. And I think the purpose for the 
23 rule is to avoid confusion about the ground of decision 
24 for the trial court. If you have got two errors, and 
25 she says the instruction's no good, on appellate review 
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1 you don't know which basis was at issue. There is no 
2 doubt here the basis on which the trial court was 
3 ruling, is there? 
4 MR. PECK: I believe there is — there — 
5 first of all the trial judge rejected this instruction 
6 on multiple grounds, and made it clear that the illicit 
7 profits request was contrary to the Oregon statute that 
8 sets up the criteria. She found other parts confusing 
9 and contradictory. But — and -- but there are two 
10 things that I think are significant here. 
11 You have to look at what was discussed 
12 here. The trial judge, if you turn to 21a of the joint 
13 appendix: "We are not here to punish for other 
14 plaintiffs1 harms. We are here to punish, if we are 
15 here to punish at all, for the conduct that caused harm 
16 to Jesse Williams on or after September 1, 1988." This 
17 sounds very much like an acceptance of the rule that 
18 Philip Morris was advocating. 
19 On 19a she says: "These punitive damages 
20 are not designed to compensate for other plaintiffs who 
21 are not here. " On 20a there is a colloquy; she 
22 expresses her belief that the risk is adequately guarded 
23 against, suggests language to express that, and asks: 
24 "Does that get you where you need to be?" 
25 That's when Philip Morris's counsel says 
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1 "Okay." She had every reason to believe that she had 
2 satisfied it. She then follows up. 
3 JUSTICE STEVENS: Do we give any weight in 
4 the case to the fact that the instruction that the 
5 Petitioners now request and the rule had not really been 
6 announced clearly as of the time of this trial? It's 
7 not exactly a new rule, but let's — for our sake we 
8 will call it a new rule. Does that have any weight? 
9 MR. PECK: I don't think it does. 
10 JUSTICE STEVENS: But it does in our cause 
11 and prejudice jurisprudence. In habeas, which is also a 
12 civil action — 
13 MR. PECK: I understand. 
14 JUSTICE STEVENS: -- we say there is an 
15 overarching Federal principle that allows; because of 
16 cause and prejudice, we can consider the Federal issue. 
17 We do that all the time. Those cases weren't raised by 
18 the Petitioner, but it seems to me they're quite 
19 relevant here, especially when you consider the 
20 importance of the constitutional issue, which was not 
21 really — let's face it — clear to counsel on either 
22 side of the aisle or to the trial judge. 
23 MR. PECK: Well, here's the reason why I 
24 think in the context of this record, and — and this 
25 litigant, it is not significant. And that is, if you 
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1 look at 21a, the appendix in our — our merit brief, 
2 there we have Philip Morris in another smoker trial in 
3 Oregon offering up a requested instruction on this 
4 issue. This is in 2002, so it's well before this 
5 Court's decision in this case. 
6 It's even before State Farm v. Campbell, and 
7 the requested instruction says, one sentence: "You are 
8 not to impose punishment for harms suffered by persons 
9 other than the plaintiff before you." 
10 JUSTICE STEVENS: But the trial judge didn't 
11 have the benefit of -- of the ruling that this Court has 
12 subsequently made on that point. The trial judge in 
13 fact here said: Now, if you can give me a case, then I 
14 will give you an instruction; you can't give me a case. 
15 And she was right. 
16 MR. PECK: But she — but that's actually 
17 not the same issue that she asked that on. Counsel 
18 cited page 17a of the joint appendix for that question. 
19 And if you look at the bottom of 16a, her question: 
20 "Let me stop first and go back to the proportionality 
21 point you are making. " This is the ratio point, the 
22 second guidepost of BMW v. Gore. She says: "Is there 
23 case law that says the trial court shall, in order to 
24 have a constitutional instruction, tell the jury about 
25 proportionality?" And this is where he says: It's 
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1 addressed post-verdict. She asks: Is there any case 
2 law; and she says: No, I'm not going to go there. I'm 
3 not going to go where no judge has gone before, because 
4 she did not want to be reversed. 
5 So she is trying to be careful, and I think 
6 you have to credit the Oregon --
7 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but I — it sounds 
8 to me like that you are confirming my concerns. 
9 MR. PECK: No. I — I think that what she 
10 said is as to the proportionality issue. On the other 
11 issue, she even returns to it later when Philip Morris 
12 bring up a different issue with respect to punitive 
13 damages. 
14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Oh. Oh, you're — you are 
15 saying that if our law had been clear at the time, that 
16 she still wouldn't have given the instruction? 
17 MR. PECK: No. I'm saying that she thought 
18 she was complying with that. She stated on the record 
19 that: We are not here to punish for other plaintiffs' 
20 harms. Later on that other issue, if you look at 28a — 
21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So your — your contention 
22 is, is that this trial court and the counsel in the case 
23 had all the guidance necessary to give the correct 
24 i n s t r u c t i o n — 
25 MR. PECK: She — 
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1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: — before — before we 
2 even announced the rule? 
3 MR. PECK: She seemed to accept — she 
4 accepted the point before you announced the rule, and 
5 the Oregon Court of Appeals ruling in the Estate of 
6 Schwarz case where they offered that one-sentence 
7 instruction, reversed the verdict, in part because that 
8 instruction they said should have been given. So they 
9 anticipated this Court's rule. I think --
10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: To move — to move 
11 from the trial court to the appellate court, if you are 
12 correct that there is this routine, clear rule of State 
13 procedure, why would the appellate court say, in its 
14 head, well, I could rely on that, but I want to decide 
15 this complicated, difficult rule of Federal 
16 constitutional law instead? 
17 MR. PECK: Well, in fact, the — the court 
18 thought it was relying on it. In each of the previous 
19 iterations in the Oregon Court of Appeals and in the 
20 Oregon Supreme Court, they cited this rule, "clear and 
21 correct in all respects," in order to reject the "harm 
22 to others" instruction because they said it was 
23 inconsistent with State law. 
24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you think we just 
25 made a mistake in going ahead and reaching the Federal 
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1 procedural rule that we reached because it was barred by 
2 this adequate and independent State ground that the 
3 Oregon courts had relied upon? 
4 MR. PECK: No. What I'm saying is that they 
5 went further then, and this is what gave this Court the 
6 authority to rule on that substantive issue. They said 
7 that that request was inconsistent with the Oregon 
8 statute. And they did so — on page 48a of the 
9 petition, where they say: "In Williams 1, the Court of 
10 Appeals concluded that the instruction was incorrect 
11 under State law. We agree." 
12 And then again on page 52a, they note that: 
13 "That is not correct as an independent matter of Oregon 
14 law respecting the conduct of juri trials and 
15 instructions" — 
16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But then I think 
17 your — 
18 MR. PECK: But — 
19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But I think your 
20 answer — go ahead with your but. 
21 (Laughter.) 
22 MR. PECK: But then they went on to say: 
23 "And nothing in due process requires us to look at this 
24 differently." That's where they made their error. That 
25 was the constitutional mistake that the Oregon court 
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1 made. They thought they were wrong on a State ground. 
2 They thought there was no Federal issue addressing that, 
3 and so they decided that they didn't have to reach any 
4 other State law issues. And they ignored the well 
5 preserved objections that Mrs. Williams made to the 
6 other parts of this unified instruction on punitive 
7 damages. 
8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I'm sorry. I 
9 still don't see that answer. You are saying they said 
10 yes, there was this rule of Oregon law, but you can 
11 still reach — there might still be a Federal due 
12 process issue, so we just can't rely on that. And if 
13 that's true, then that seems to me to be a concession 
14 that this is not an adequate and independent State 
15 ground that would bar consideration of a Federal 
16 constitutional issue. 
17 MR. PECK: What was not an adequate on 
18 independent State grounds was their decision that the 
19 Oregon statute which permits you to punish a misconduct 
20 in order to deter others from doing that allowed 
21 punishment for harm to non-parties. 
22 That part was their interpretation of the 
23 statute, and if there were no due process equation here, 
24 that would have been an independent State ground. It 
25 was wrong as a matter of due process. 
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1 But there are other grounds, other mistakes, 
2 substantive mistakes, avoiding law in this instruction. 
3 And any trial court that gave instruction number 34, 
4 which was objected to as a whole, would have committed 
5 reversible error because they failed to follow the 
6 Oregon statute. 
7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I guess I think it's 
8 the more routine practice for a court, if you have a --
9 again, as you argue -- a clear procedural rule that bars 
10 addressing the substantive issue, to go ahead and rely 
11 on that. Now, if the procedural rule is difficult and 
12 of uncertain application, maybe you go ahead and say, 
13 well, we we're going to decide on the merits anyway. 
14 But it seems to me, under your presentation, 
15 it's the other way around. It's a clear and easy 
16 procedural rule, difficult Federal and State intertwined 
17 constitutional rule, and yet the court says, well, I'm 
18 going to do the hard work rather than the easy work. 
19 MR. PECK: I think it was natural for the 
20 court to do that. That was the issue presented to them 
21 by Philip Morris. And courts do not reach out to do 
22 other issues. They reach — they were being solicitous 
23 of Philip Morris, and they were addressing the arguments 
24 that Philip Morris made. And when they decided that 
25 that inured to Mrs. Williams benefit, not to Philip 
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1 Morris's benefit, then they said we don't need to 
2 address your other questions. And I think have you to 
3 look at the Oregon Supreme Court noting in their own 
4 decision that there was no futility here. In fact, the 
5 last time we were here Philip Morris said the reason 
6 they needed this instruction was because of what was 
7 said at closing argument. 
8 JUSTICE BREYER: What are the elements? 
9 Imagine -- I'm trying to get help, if I were to try to 
10 put pen to paper on this. Suppose they win in this. 
11 Then we will be back at the State law issue that I 
12 thought was going to be there, which was the issue of --
13 you are talking about the colloquy. Did they give the 
14 essence of the Federal mandated instruction, or didn't 
15 they? And then look how cooperative the judge was, et 
16 cetera. But that isn't before us now. 
17 What is before us now is something that 
18 blocks our consideration of that or anybody's 
19 consideration of that. And imagine this is not your 
20 case; imagine it is the most, you know, striking case, 
21 that's why I used a death example, and we go through 
22 exactly the same thing. And then the court does exactly 
23 the same thing, the State court, that happened here. 
24 And now what are the words that distinguish whether the 
25 court is in essence, to be colloquial, giving everybody 
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1 the runaround or whether the court is applying a — an 
2 absolute, clear, you know, fair, standard of State law? 
3 Which really they should have gone into first and saved 
4 everybody a lot of trouble. 
5 MR. PECK: I think the easiest way to look 
6 at this --
7 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. 
8 MR. PECK: — is imagine that the statute of 
9 limitations, which now bars any such suit in Oregon, 
10 were brought today, after this Court's decision in 
11 Williams, and imagine that Philip Morris is the 
12 defendant, and at the end of the trial they offer their 
13 number 34 as it was before saying, "This Court said that 
14 they had made the right choice in asking for this 
15 instruction." 
16 A trial court clearly would engage in 
17 reversible error if they gave that instruction because 
18 it materially departs from Oregon law. At the same 
19 time, they could deny that instruction. They could deny 
20 that instruction, and the Oregon Supreme Court would not 
21 violate the mandate of this Court's decision by saying 
22 that that is a correct decision on the part of the trial 
23 law court because it was not clear and correct in all 
24 respects. 
25 And that is part of what distinguishes this. 
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1 This is still a rule that has to apply to its 
2 instruction — 
3 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, what they say is — 
4 look at the two errors they found. One is in saying 
5 "may" instead of "shall," and the other is in saying 
6 "illicit profit" instead of "profit." And they are 
7 pretty picky. So, this is very picky, they say. And 
8 not only are they being picky, but they are being picky 
9 after the event. And they could have raised it first, 
10 and they have 28 cases supporting them, but none of 
11 these cases is right on point because the subject matter 
12 is, you know, closer bound up. And so they put all this 
13 together and say itfs an unreasonable application of a 
14 rule that was there. And you say --
15 MR. PECK: I would urge you, Justice Breyer, 
16 to look at the original case in 1916, the Sorenson case. 
17 There the court was face with a question: If there is 
18 the kernel of a correct instruction in there, is that 
19 adequate to ask the court to give that instruction or 
20 should we insist on what they thought at the time was 
21 the majority rule in the United States, that we should 
22 insist on an instruction that is clear and correct in 
23 all respects, and that the — that the counsel has the 
24 responsibility to provide that? And they decided to go 
25 with the clear and correct rule. That was the debate 
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1 that they had, and that debate informs this one. 
2 JUSTICE BREYER: Sorenson was the agent and 
3 the principal, the broker who was selling some land. 
4 MR. PECK: Right. 
5 JUSTICE BREYER: And I think in that case 
6 they also said, "By the way, you've got basically the 
7 instruction that you wanted, and you overlooked" — no, 
8 that was the case where they said, "You overlooked in 
9 your instruction an important allegation of fact," which 
10 allegation was that the guy had been rehired as a 
11 broker. 
12 MR. PECK: And there's a similar distinction 
13 that makes Osborne irrelevant, which counsel suggested 
14 was a — an exemplary here. 
15 In Osborne, an element of the crime had not 
16 been instructed upon. That's why there didn't have to 
17 be the offer of an instruction. But the party 
18 presentation principle puts the onus on counsel to do 
19 so, and Philip Morris showed, in 2002, well before this 
20 Court's decisions that they know how to do it when they 
21 want to. 
22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Peck, are you — are 
23 you asserting that our remand order was in error? After 
24 all, it did say, "We remand this case so that the Oregon 
25 Supreme Court can apply this standard we have set 
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1 forth." 
2 MR. PECK: And I — I'd contend, Your Honor, 
3 that the --
4 JUSTICE BREYER: We didn't say it was in 
5 error. I mean, there is nothing wrong with that. 
6 (Laughter.) 
7 MR. PECK: Well, I think — 
8 JUSTICE SCALIA: If you say it's in error, 
9 my next question is going to be --
10 MR. PECK: I think the Oregon Supreme Court 
11 read that decision --
12 JUSTICE SCALIA: — can — is it up to a 
13 State court to sit in judgment about whether our remand 
14 orders are in error or not? 
15 MR. PECK: Well, I'm prepared to say that 
16 the Oregon Supreme Court took that remand order to mean 
17 that they had to have in place — this was a procedural 
18 due process decision — that they had to have a 
19 procedure that was fair, outcome neutral, applied — 
20 JUSTICE SCALIA: If that's what they took it 
21 to mean, they were just wrong. I mean, that's not what 
22 it says. 
23 MR. PECK: Well, if you look — 
24 JUSTICE SCALIA: The opinion concludes, "As 
25 the preceding discussion makes clear, we believe the 
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1 Oregon Supreme Court applied the wrong constitutional 
2 standard when considering Philip Morris's appeal." And 
3 it goes to the constitutional issue we are talking 
4 about. 
5 MR. PECK: When considering — 
6 JUSTICE SCALIA: "We remand so that the 
7 Oregon Supreme Court can apply the standard we have set 
8 forth," which has nothing to do with the issue we have 
9 been discussing this morning. 
10 MR. PECK: Your Honor — 
11 JUSTICE SCALIA: So it was wrong? 
12 MR. PECK: No, it was not wrong. I don't 
13 think it was wrong, and here's the reason I don't think 
14 it was wrong: You corrected the Oregon Supreme Court 
15 when that thought that due process does not inform the 
16 analysis on harm to non-parties. You corrected that 
17 substantive error, and that part is what they got wrong. 
18 Much of this opinion said that they got lots 
19 of other things right. And so Oregon looked at it and 
20 said, "Okay, we got that issue wrong, but there are 
21 other problems with this instruction that are adequate 
22 and independent grounds for --
23 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's very nice, but 
24 that's not what we remanded for. 
25 MR. PECK: You did not remand for that, but 
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1 when this Court decides a constitutional issue of one 
2 part, it doesn't necessarily tell the court anything 
3 different. What — the essence of this Court's opinion 
4 is that where there's a significant risk of jury 
5 confusion, the State has to provide a procedure and has 
6 flexibility in providing that procedure. There is no 
7 indication that the procedure for limiting instructions 
8 does not satisfy that. 
9 JUSTICE SOUTER: The problem that I think we 
10 all have is how do we guard, in effect, guard against 
11 making constitutional decisions which are simply going 
12 to be nullified by some clever device raising a 
13 procedural issue or an issue of State law when the case 
14 goes back? Is there any way for us to ensure against, 
15 in effect, a bad faith response to our decision except 
16 by purporting to require the State courts to follow a 
17 certain order of battle in the decision of issues before 
18 them so that when the case gets to us, we can be assured 
19 that there is no lurking issue that has not yet been 
20 decided as a matter of State law that in effect could 
21 then be resurrected to nullify our decision? Is there 
22 any way to guard against that except by telling the 
23 State courts what the sequence is in which they have to 
24 make decisions? 
25 MR. PECK: I believe there is. And I 
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1 believe that it would be error to suggest to the State 
2 supreme court that they must, even though prudent, 
3 follow a specific sequence, simply because that would 
4 mean that they would have to necessarily decide every 
5 State law issue in the case — 
6 JUSTICE SOUTER: I — I see the problem. I 
7 mean, that's why I raised the question, how can we 
8 ensure — 
9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But we do that all the 
10 time in cause and prejudice cases. We do it all the 
11 time --
12 MR. PECK: Yes. 
13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: — because of the 
14 importance of the constitutional right. 
15 MR. PECK: I understand that, but I think 
16 the adequate and independent State law ground provides 
17 all the protection. You assume, and I think properly 
18 so, that State supreme courts will operate in good 
19 faith. Even in Flowers, after the fourth trip to the 
20 U.S. Supreme Court, were — Alabama Supreme Court was 
21 still trusted to apply the decision. 
22 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay. Your — your answer 
23 is there is — there is no way to guard against it 
24 except — 
25 MR. PECK: Except — 
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1 JUSTICE SOUTER: — by reviewing the good 
2 faith of what the court does on remand. 
3 MR. PECK: Well, by -- by accepting that if 
4 the rule that has been imposed was invoked properly by 
5 the party that invoked it at the right time — 
6 JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes. 
7 MR. PECK: — that it IS firmly established 
8 and regularly followed, then it should satisfy the 
9 Court — 
10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But it serves very little 
11 interest. Nothing the trial judge would have done, 
12 nothing the plaintiff's counsel has done below, nothing 
13 that the intermediate clause would have done, would have 
14 -- would have been different if they had submitted what 
15 they call the "correct in all respects" rule. 
16 If they had filed the "correct in all 
17 respects" rule and submitted that rule -- if she had 
18 said, judge, I want to type a little piece of paper, 
19 everything would have been the same. 
20 MR. PECK: I suggest that it would be 
21 different. I think the Oregon Supreme Court decided, 
22 when they decided that there was no futility in offering 
23 another one, that it would be different. And the fact 
24 of the matter is that — 
25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I excluded the Oregon 
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1 Supreme Court from my list of — of participants who 
2 would have done something differently. 
3 MR. PECK: But — but — but the fact of the 
4 matter is, if after closing arguments which was the 
5 trigger that Philip Morris urged upon this Court for 
6 needing this substantive rule, if after — if after that 
7 Philip Morris's counsel had returned to the judge — you 
8 know, they said a few things that we think would tell 
9 the jury to punish for harm to others. We don't think 
10 the instruction is adequate. We will give you the same 
11 instruction, that one-sentence instruction like we gave 
12 in Fink v. Schwarz. I believe the court would have 
13 given that instruction. 
14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: There is, of course, 
15 another way to protect our constitutional authority in 
16 this case. We are talking about procedures for 
17 addressing the substantive due-process challenge to 
18 a punitive damages award. That is the second question 
19 presented here. 
20 If we went and granted that question and 
21 considered that issue, we would have protected our 
22 authority to reach that question despite the procedural 
23 objections alone. Why don't we just do that? 
24 MR. PECK: Well, Your Honor, of course, the 
25 last time we were here you had a full briefing and even 
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1 some argument on that. And I — 1 believe that we are 
2 prepared to stand on that briefing and argument. 
3 We do not believe the Due Process Clause is 
4 an exercise in elementary school mathematics. It does 
5 not tell you something about this. Here you have to 
6 look at the enormity of the misconduct. And that did --
7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm not asking you 
8 to argue here today the second question presented. 
9 MR. PECK: I understand. 
10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But if we have some 
11 concern, if there is something malodorous about the fact 
12 that the Oregon Supreme Court waited until the last 
13 minute to come up with this rule that was before it all 
14 the time, which was a State court rule that you would 
15 expect the State court to be addressing as a matter of 
16 course, then — then we -- we can avoid having to 
17 address what we do in a situation, having to 
18 characterize the nature of that -- that consideration, 
19 simply by saying: Look, we are going to go ahead with 
20 the questions presented. We can decide it in this case; 
21 and to avoid having to reach that, we will go ahead and 
22 do it. 
23 MR. PECK: Well, it's — itfs certainly 
24 within this Court's power to do that. Philip Morris had 
25 made a very harsh accusation in this case of bad faith 
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1 on the part of the Oregon Supreme Court. There was no 
2 sandbagging here. The Oregon court did not act in that 
3 way. 
4 Mrs. Williams raised the State-law issues at 
5 every opportunity, which is something that Philip Morris 
6 denied in their petition but then conceded in their 
7 merit brief. And the fact is it was before the Oregon 
8 Court of Appeals. It was before the Oregon Supreme 
9 Court, and we even raised it before this court. 
10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You — in answer to the 
11 Chief Justice, you are not suggesting that we should go 
12 ahead and decide the second question when there has been 
13 no briefing on it? 
14 MR. PECK: I am not suggesting that you 
15 decide the question, but I recognize the Court has the 
16 power to do so. Mapp v. Ohio came to this Court as a 
17 First Amendment case and came out as a Fourth Amendment 
18 case. 
19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I — I thought — 
20 Mr. Peck, I thought you just told me that there has been 
21 full and adequate briefing on that question. 
22 MR. PECK: I believe we had full and 
23 adequate briefing. We may not have had an opportunity 
24 to fully argue the case, and itfs up for you to decide 
25 whether or not you — you have enough on that. 
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1 I thank you. 
2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. 
3 Mr. Shapiro, you have three minutes remaining. 
4 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO 
5 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 
6 MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. 
7 Justice Breyer asked about these various cases from 
8 Oregon, whether they provided guidance and a warning 
9 here. And counsel referred to three cases, Reeve, 
10 Owings and then Sorenson. If you look at those cases, 
11 you will see there were simple instructions proposed on 
12 a single topic that were infected with an error 
13 throughout. 
14 And the court said if there is any valid 
15 proportion of this instruction, it was covered by 
16 something that was said to the jury already. So there 
17 was no harm in not giving that instruction. 
18 That is certainly not our case. We have a 
19 separately numbered paragraph dealing with the 
20 Constitution, which is guite apart from the statutory 
21 factors. 
22 Now, counsel referred to the charge actually 
23 given by the court as if it provided some protection 
24 against punishment for harm to nonparties. If you read 
25 that instruction, far from providing the protection that 
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1 the — this Court said was obligatory, it invited global 
2 punishment. It told the jury they could return any 
3 punitive-damage award up to one hundred million dollars. 
4 Lo and behold, they come up with eighty million dollars, 
5 right within the suggested range of this charge. And 
6 there was no --
7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Which portion of the 
8 charge specifically are you referring to? 
9 MR. SHAPIRO: This is page 37a of our joint 
10 appendix. The — the court concludes the amount of 
11 punitive damages you assess may not exceed the sum of 
12 one hundred million dollars. And that, of course, was 
13 the zone of reasonableness that the jury inferred from 
14 this, suggesting a global punishment to the jury with no 
15 protection. 
16 Now this Court said that that protection has 
17 to be provided. The Court said the State must insist, 
18 that the State must give assurance, and it's an 
19 important constitutional right, as Justice Kennedy said. 
20 I don't think the State court --
21 JUSTICE BREYER: What is your response to 
22 the Chief Justice's suggestion that maybe we should 
23 reach the issue of due process on the amount? 
24 MR. SHAPIRO: We wouldn't oppose that 
25 because this is clearly excessive under what the Court 
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1 said in State Farm: Where there is substantial 
2 compensatory damages, one to one is something of a norm, 
3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I wasn't asking to 
4 you argue it, either but I mean I suppose the procedure 
5 the parties would prefer, if we were interested in that, 
6 would be for us to grant the second question and then 
7 have the normal briefing in consideration, 
8 MR. SHAPIRO: Oh, that ~ that — yes, 
9 certainly, that -- that -- that is true. I — I would 
10 comment, too, on Justice Breyer's question about what is 
11 the ultimate test here. 
12 The Court has stated various criteria and 
13 opinions over the last century, but the -- the key ideas 
14 are? Was it an ambush, something that couldn't be 
15 anticipated? 
16 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean I will tell you my 
17 subjective reaction going through these 38 cases is they 
18 are not quite in point, but they really take away the 
19 idea of the bad faith, particularly because the first 
20 time what the judge said, which I didn't understand its 
21 significance then, but the judge said: Well, since the 
22 first part of that paragraph was in — was in error 
23 anyway, I don't have to reach the question of whether 
24 there were other mistakes under State law in the rest of 
25 the instruction. They did say that the first time, I 
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1 t h i n k . 
2 MR. SHAPIRO: Oh, yes, but this is the first 
3 time the Court has ever taken this "correct in all 
4 respects" rule and extended it to a completely different 
5 topic, U.S. constitutional law in a separately numbered 
6 paragraph. And we had no notice that this had to be 
7 broken out on a separate piece of paper. If we did, we 
8 would have broken it out on a separate piece of paper. 
9 It's just like Lee against Kemna where the Court said — 
10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about this point 
11 that was made that in 2002 that is exactly what Philip 
12 Morris did, give one simple, precise instruction? 
13 MR. SHAPIRO: Well, no, that instruction was 
14 not harm to nonparties. That was harm for out-of-State 
15 injuries. It was a different issue. And it's true the 
16 lawyers there did break up their instructions 
17 differently, but the pattern instruction — 
18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is it — is it true that 
19 they gave one simple sentence stating their position on 
20 — on what harm to others, how that --
21 MR. SHAPIRO: No. That's not true. That 
22 case did not accept our instruction. It did not. It 
23 accepted the State Farm instruction, which said that 
24 there can't be punishment for out-of-State harm. 
25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But — but was the 
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1 instruction stated in a -- in a single paragraph, but 
2 all the other requests to charge were broken out? 
3 MR. SHAPIRO: Yes. This — this State Farm 
4 instruction was broken out. That's an option for 
5 lawyers. But under the pattern instruction, it's quite 
6 proper to put them all in one instructional basket. 
7 That's what the form instructions said, and that's what 
8 both parties here did. 
9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. 
10 The case is submitted. 
11 MR. SHAPIRO: We thank the Court. 
12 (Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the case in the 
13 above-entitled matter was submitted.) 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 4 
Over the last 25 years, Utah courts have consistently held that if a party fails to object to, 
stipulates to, or submits incorrect jury instructions at the trial court level, then the party 
has waived their right to appeal the instruction. 
• State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, 1flf 60-63,114 P.3d 551 (failure to object and 
stipulated to the instruction); 
• State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 14, 86 P.3d 742 (party submitted incorrect 
jury instruction to trial court); 
• State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, fflf 27-29, 70 P.3d 111 (stipulated to instruction); 
• R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, fflf 10-11,40 P.3d 1119 (failure to object); 
• Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mineral Corporation, 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997) 
(failure to object with specificity); 
• Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988) (failure to object); 
• King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 621 -22 (Utah 1987) (court held that party waived 
objection to jury instruction since they failed to timely object); 
• Penrod v. Carter, 137 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987) (failure to object); 
• Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah 1985) (failure 
to object with sufficient specificity); 
This string citation includes both criminal and civil cases. The rules governing both are 
nearly identical. See Utah R. Crim. P. 19; Utah R. Civ. P. 51. 
• State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, f 12, 236 P.3d 155 (failure to object); 
• State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, ffl[ 11-12, 186 P.3d 1023 (failure to 
object); 
• State v. Bennett, 2008 UT App 126, *1 (unpublished decision, attached) (failure to 
object); 
• State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, ffl[ 14-16, 143 P.3d 302 (stipulated to 
incorrect jury instruction); 
• Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, fflf 30-31, 158 P.3d 562 (failure to object); 
• State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317, \ 19, 169 P.3d 806 (failure to object); 
• State v. Leber, 2007 UT App 273, \ 14, 167 P.3d 1091 (party submitted incorrect 
jury instruction); 
• State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, fflf 12-13, 136 P.3d 1261 (failure to object); 
• State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, \ 26, 153 P.3d 804 (failure to object); 
• State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, \ 8, 132 P.3d 703 (failure to object); 
• State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, 1f 12,63 P.3d 110 (stipulated to jury 
instruction); 
• Chapman v. Uintah County, 2003 UT App 383, ffif 25-26, 81 P.3d 761 (stipulated 
to jury instruction); 
• State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, \ 39, 57 P.3d 1139 (failed to submit 
instruction); 
• State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 311,\ 21, 37 P.3d 1180 (stipulated to jury 
instruction); 
• State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, flf 54-55, 989 P.2d 1091 (stipulated to jury 
instruction); 
• State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, f 23,975 P.2d 469 (failure to object); 
• State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (failure to object); 
• Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457,460-61 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (failure to object with sufficient specificity); 
• Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (failure to object); 
• State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (party submitted the 
jury instruction); 
• Mann v. Wadsworth, 776 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (failure to object); 
• VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distributions, Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 964-65 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (failure to object). 
